THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, THE PEACE PROCESS
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Address by Ambassador Bernard Goonetilleke
at Capitol Hill, Washington DC - 25 January 2008

Ladies and Gentlemen:
I am privileged, to be able to share with you,
some thoughts on Sri Lanka’s attempts at conflict resolution
and peace negotiation with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
or the LTTE, which, the FBI earlier this month introduced as,
“one of the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the
world.”
I regret that Dr. Peter Chalk, who was to speak
on “The International Dimension of the LTTE,” could
not be with us today. However, as intended, I shall focus on the
Ceasefire Agreement, the peace process and the role of the international
community, while Dr. Stanley Samarasinghe will speak on how Sri
Lanka could realistically resolve the conflict.
Separate state based on mythology
You are aware that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic,
multi-religious democracy, in fact, one of the oldest democracies
in South Asia. You are also aware that the LTTE shuns democracy,
and intends, through terrorism, to establish a mono-ethnic, mono-political
separate state in Sri Lanka’s north and east. This separate
state will encompass approximately 30% of the country’s
landmass, and is intended for Sri Lankan Tamils, who, according
to the1981 census, comprise approximately 12% of the county’s
population. The majority of these Tamils, incidentally, live outside
the north and the east.
LTTE Leader, Prabhakaran in a speech on November
27, last year said, and I quote, “We are struggling only
to regain our sovereignty in our own historical land where we
have lived for centuries, the sovereignty which we lost to colonial
occupiers.” The sovereignty he spoke of ended in 1560, when
the Portuguese defeated Jaffna’s ruler, Cankili 1, more
than 200 years before the U.S. declaration of independence. Note
that Cankili’s rule at that time was limited to Jaffna,
and did not extend to present day northern and eastern provinces.
The LTTE demand for a separate state, called
“Tamil Eelam,” at best, can be described as “fictitious,”
for there was never, at any time in Sri Lanka’s history,
“a traditional Tamil homeland,” as the Vadukkodai
Resolution of 1976 declared, based on an erroneous claim by the
first British colonial Secretary Hugh Cleghorn.
Sri Lanka is a small island, home to 20 million,
similar in size to West Virginia, or is twice the size of the
island of Hawaii. It has been home to many ethnic groups for over
2000 years, who migrated north to south and south to north over
the years. Thus, the Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors, Burghers, Malays
and other communities, too numerous to be listed, can all rightfully
claim the island as their traditional homeland.
The Ceasefire Agreement
Sri Lanka’s Ceasefire agreement or the
CFA and its recent abrogation, has been very much in the news
these days. My familiarity with the CFA runs back to the time
of its presentation in draft form by Norway, to its signature
in February 2002, to its implementation, or more to the point,
its brazen violation by the LTTE, from day one. I recall my critical
remark in early November 2005, that a glaring defect of the CFA
was the inordinate haste of its conclusion, denying the opportunity,
particularly to the Sri Lanka government, to deeply scrutinize
it.
The eagerness to conclude the CFA with least
delay, was due to the fact, that by Christmas 2001, the government
had agreed to an informal ceasefire initiated by the LTTE, and
Norway, in its wisdom, considered it desirable to have a formal
agreement signed before the informal ceasefire began to unravel.
In retrospect, at least some of the CFA’s shortcomings could
have been addressed, if the parties had more time to consider
the ramifications of individual articles of the agreement, including
practicability of timelines indicated in the CFA.
On January 3, 2008, the government gave notice
to abrogate the CFA, which became operational on January 17, 2008.
Since then, many close observers of Sri Lanka’s conflict
and the peace process, Co-Chairs of the Tokyo Donor Conference
viz. Norway, Japan, the US and the EU, other friends of Sri Lanka
and the civil society, have expressed concern. The sentiments
commonly expressed have been that withdrawal from the CFA would
escalate fighting, leading to heavy civilian casualties and violation
of human rights, that there is no military solution to the conflict,
that a solution can be found only through negotiation, and that
parties to the conflict should return to the CFA.
Let me pause here to comment.
First, the government’s
notice of abrogation on January 3, was not out of the ordinary,
as Article 4.4 of the CFA provided for either party to withdraw
by giving 14 days notice to Norway. The government action to abide
by the agreement, contrasts with the LTTE’s actions with
respect to the previous truce, where the LTTE commenced hostilities
following several hours of notice, on April 18 1995.
Second, the demand of a return
to the CFA is like requesting a return to the make-believe world
in which Sri Lankans lived since 2002. True, the CFA halted open
hostilities and saved many lives. However, those who are familiar
with the CFA would recall that the LTTE began violating the agreement
willy-nilly, within weeks of signing it. By end April 2007, Tigers
had amassed a catalogue of 3800 violations as determined by the
Nordic monitors, as against some 300 minor violations by the government
forces. I vividly recall how one of those initial violations took
me to Kilinochchi for a meeting with late Thamil Chelvam. That
encounter proved, beyond any doubt, how fickle the Tigers were,
about upholding the nascent CFA. Throughout the CFA, they engaged
in serious truce violations such as, assassinating moderate Tamil
politicians, officials and members of the armed forces; murdering
political opponents; engaging in suicide bombings; abducting civilians
for ransom; and conscripting child soldiers, despite the tripartite
agreement signed with the government and UNICEF. It was during
this so-called “ceasefire,” that the Tigers assassinated
foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, made two attempts to kill
another Tamil minister, Douglas Devananda, using female suicide
bombers, and employed yet another female suicide bomber in an
attempt to assassinate the commander of the Sri Lanka Army. I
wonder, which country, among those who ask Sri Lanka today to
return to the CFA, would agree to continue with a charade of that
nature, in the face of such grave provocations.
It is a fact that a ceasefire agreement existed
until recently. However, the violations listed by Nordic monitors
clearly establish that the Tigers never ceased firing.
What remained of the CFA, until its recent abrogation, was an
agreement on paper, rendered defunct by the Tigers,
from day one. In this backdrop, it is ironical that, after the
government served notice to withdraw from the CFA, the LTTE solemnly
declared, it would uphold the CFA 100%! However, none of those
critical of the government’s decision, thought it fit to
ask the Tigers why they failed to uphold the CFA 100% since inception.
Third, critics predict that
Sri Lanka’s withdrawal from the CFA would result in increased
levels of violence. If the Tigers had been genuine about a negotiated
settlement, they had a golden opportunity in November 2005, when
President Mahinda Rajapaksa was sworn in as President of Sri Lanka.
The President, in his inaugural speech, said, “I reaffirm
my commitment & determination to pursue the peace process
to achieve an honourable peace that will respect the aspirations
of all communities in our country…. To achieve this noble
goal, my Government will be ready to engage the L.T.T.E. in discussing
a political solution, when the L.T.T.E. declares their readiness
to resume negotiations, which they unilaterally abandoned.”
Two days after the inauguration, Prabhakaran acknowledged President
Rajapaksa as a pragmatic man and said that he would give him time
to find a solution to the conflict.
Pause for a moment to examine the difference
between the words and the deeds of the Tigers.
Eight days later, on December 5, 2005, the Tigers
carried out their first claymore mine attack against the armed
forces. This was followed by killing scores of civilians in isolated
villages, bombing of a market place in Trincomalee, employing
a suicide bomber to assassinate the Army Commander, killing the
third most senior officer of the army and detonating claymore
mines targeting a bus carrying civilian passengers, taking the
lives of over 60 passengers.
Thus, sane thinking would indicate that it was
not the abrogation of the CFA that would lead to increased violence,
but it was the ever increasing violence and grave provocations
that led the government to abrogate the CFA.
Fourth, Sri Lanka shares the
view of its friends, the US included, that the conflict can only
be resolved politically, not militarily. President Rajapaksa said
so on the day of his inauguration, and has, since, repeated it
many times. If you think that the political leadership says one
thing, and the military is pursuing its own agenda, Army Commander
Sarath Fonseka, said at a media briefing on January 12, 2008,
and I quote, “Ultimately, any solution will have to be political.
But there can be a political solution only after the LTTE has
laid down arms.”
Fifth, on the subject of the
CFA, Sri Lanka has attempted no less than six series of negotiations,
since 1985. Of those, only the last three, in 1995, 2002/2003
and 2006 were conducted in an environment of CFAs. This demonstrates
that a CFA, while being a useful tool, is not essential for negotiations,
if parties to the conflict are serious about a resolution. What
is essential is to conduct negotiations in good faith until a
lasting solution to the conflict is agreed upon.
Finally, a “ceasefire”
by its very definition, is a temporary measure, until it is replaced
by a more permanent arrangement. Similarly, the CFA signed between
the government and the LTTE was a temporary suspension of hostilities
until negotiations were concluded. After the Tigers unilaterally
moved away from negotiations in April 2003, it took Norway nearly
three years to bring them back to the table. When they repeated
their performance in October 2006, there seemed little prospect
of their return. Neither can the government be confident that
the Tigers would be any less fickle in future peace talks, than
they have been during the last two decades.
Peace Talks
Thus, it is regrettable that the international
community has failed to understand the complex dynamics that have
played out over nearly three decades in Sri Lanka. With the ease
of the uninformed, some countries repeatedly call on the government
and the LTTE, to shun hostilities and to resume peace talks. The
reality is that Sri Lanka has attempted negotiations with the
Tigers on six different occasions, viz., in 1985 at Thimpu with
Indian mediation; in 1987 with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi taking
the lead; during 1989/90 with President Premadasa; in 1995 with
President Chandrika Kumaratunga; during 2002/03 with Prime Minister
Ranil Wickremesinghe; and with President Mahinda Rajapaksa in
2006. The past twenty odd years are testimony to the fact that
Tigers only agree to negotiate as a mere ploy; to buy time to
regroup, to replenish and to strengthen their fighting capability.
When adequately geared to fight, they walk away from negotiations,
as they have done at each series of talks. That was not all; they
were brazen enough to take the lives of those who initiated two
rounds of talks viz. the former Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and
President Premadasa and very nearly took the life of President
Kumaratunga, in all three instances employing suicide bombers.
We ought to ask, then, how serious were the Tigers,
when they sat at the negotiating table. I can authoritatively
speak of the six meetings we had in Bangkok, Oslo, Berlin, and
Hakone, between September 2002 and March 2003, as I was part of
the government team. The LTTE insisted that the two sides focus
on banal issues, or to borrow late Balasingham’s own words,
“the existential problems” faced by the Tamil civilians
in the north and the east first, and only after resolving them,
to discuss issues leading to a settlement of the conflict. Our
plea that we utilize the time to discuss both issues simultaneously
fell on deaf ears.
Against this background of Tiger stonewalling,
Norway made a valiant bid in Oslo, in November 2002, to persuade
the leader of the LTTE delegation to agree on a compromise, where
the LTTE agreed to the terminology “the parties agreed
to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self
- determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking
peoples, based on federal structure with an united Sri Lanka…”
and, for the first time, agreed to initiate discussions on substantive
political issues leading to a political solution, such as: Power-sharing
between the center and the region, as well as within the center;
Geographical region; Human rights protection; Political and administrative
mechanism; Public finance; and Law and order. That was a refreshing
breakthrough, given the tense atmosphere in Oslo the previous
evening. That was also a landmark decision, as the LTTE agreed
to climb down from its demand for a separate state, and the government
agreed to a solution based on a federal structure, a concession
successive governments failed to concede to the Tamil minority.
What followed thereafter is history. Opposition
soon built up against the leader of the LTTE delegation in his
own camp, and he abruptly ended a crucial visit to Wanni, following
Prabhakaran pressurizing him to retract. He returned to London,
a sick and broken man and went into isolation, severing all connections
with the LTTE, Norway and the rest of the world. Later, he painstakingly
tried to explain there was no agreement in Oslo
for a solution based on a federal arrangement!
The final meeting held in Hakone, Japan, in March
2003, was an eye opener, as that meeting clarified beyond any
doubt that the LTTE had reverted to its old position of not discussing
any substantive issue to resolve the conflict. On par with the
understanding reached in Oslo, the International Adviser on Human
Rights, Ian Martin, presented a paper, and the late Balasingham
came up with reasons why they could not agree to international
monitoring of human rights. His response was that Sri Lanka’s
national Human Rights Commission was equal to the task. When pressed
to focus on other substantive issues agreed upon in Oslo, Balasingham
sheepishly said he had no mandate to discuss any of those subjects,
proving that he had been prohibited from engaging in discussing
substantive issues by the LTTE leadership.
I have traced the history of negotiations, not
to heap blame on late Balasingham, or even on the LTTE. All what
I want to say is, that the LTTE had a clear strategy then, as
it does now, and that is, to establish a separate state by hook
or by crook, irrespective of the deaths it would cause to the
Tamil people it claims to represent, and destruction to the country.
After all, Prabhakaran has given permission to his cadres to kill
him if he wavers from the commitment he made for a separate state.
And, the slogan of the LTTE still remains “The thirst of
the Tigers is the Homeland of Tamil Eelam.”
Against this backdrop, the question we ask from
those who urge the government to seek a negotiated settlement
is, are they asking us to negotiate with the LTTE once again?
If the LTTE demand for a separate state is non-negotiable, what
exactly are we going to negotiate with them? There are more questions.
How can a democratically elected government hand over a part of
its sovereign territory to an undemocratic entity like the LTTE,
which engages in terrorism? What is the fate of the Muslim and
Sinhala people, living in the areas claimed by the LTTE, as the
traditional homeland of the Tamils?
Finally, we have to ask, who
would guarantee that this time around, the LTTE will not walk
away from the negotiating table. Some may even ask, if the players
were different, for example, would the US negotiate with a terrorist
group, which has used suicide bombers to assassinate one president,
nearly killed another president, and assassinated several secretaries,
including the Secretary of State?
There are certain individuals, who try to draw
parallels between the LTTE demands with the American demand for
independence from Britain. However, in my view, the more appropriate
comparison is to describe the LTTE to the secessionist Confederates,
who tried to break away from the Union. As President Abraham Lincoln
said in his First Inaugural Address on March 4, 1861, “Plainly,
the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy."
Likewise, “Physically speaking, we can not separate. We
cannot remove our respective sections from each other nor build
an impassable wall between them” Sri Lankan government too,
being a representative entity like the Union, finds secession
wholly unacceptable, and seeks friendship of all its citizens,
and genuine peace, as President Lincoln did, where all citizens
in the country can co-exist as equals in harmony, as they did
for many centuries.
Role of the International Community
Throughout the conflict, Sri Lanka’s friends
have remained steadfastly supportive of a negotiated solution
to the conflict. The Tigers, however, see this involvement as
being partial toward the government. In his Heroes Day speech
in November 2007, referring to the role of the international community,
Prabhakaran, said, “This partisan and unjust conduct of
the international community has severely undermined the confidence
our people had in them. And it has paved the way for the breakdown
of the ceasefire and the peace efforts.”
Despite the stance of Tigers, Sri Lanka is indeed
appreciative of the positive role played by the international
community in the war on terrorism. The ban on the LTTE, first
by India, the U.S., the U.K., followed by Canada and the 27 member
EU, has helped dampen the Tigers’ increasing ability to
raise funds for their war chest. The U.S. ban on one of the LTTE
front organizations, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO)
in November 2007, was a significant blow to the Tiger fundraising
capabilities. This kind of international action is critical to
make the Tigers realize they do not have an endless fount of resources
to carry on a relentless terrorist campaign to achieve its major
political objective, a separate state, by force of arms.
The international community also needs to persuade
the LTTE to return to the negotiating table, and to hang in there
until a satisfactory comprise is reached. Only such action will
drive home the message that undemocratic methods of seizing power
as the Tigers currently employ, are unacceptable to the civilized
world.
The international community needs to be cognizant
that democracies cannot take extra-constitutional measures, and,
political solutions to conflicts require discussion, debate and
compromise before consensus is reached.
As you may be aware, after deliberating for one
and a half years, the All Party Representative Committee (APRC),
comprising the political spectrum of the country, submitted its
proposals for devolution to the President, two days ago. Complex
arrangements for devolution and power sharing, that also involve
constitutional changes and consultation of the people, are inevitably,
an incremental process. It is necessary to remind the international
community, that this is only a beginning of an evolving process,
which requires its fullest and continuing support.
Thank you.
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