‘SRI LANKA TODAY’
ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR BERNARD GOONETILLEKE
AT THE US FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE
31 OCTOBER 2006
When we focus on a topic like ‘Sri Lanka
Today’, it is important to look back at the island’s
past, even briefly, as it has a bearing on what it is today, just
as much as what effect developments of today will have in shaping
the country tomorrow.
Geographically, Sri Lanka is an island nation
the extent of which is app. 25,000 sq. miles. While in size it
is similar to the State of West Virginia, our population is much
larger and is currently close to 20 million, with an average growth
of 1.1%. Sri Lanka’s history goes back to over 2500 years
and the island was inhabited by several groups of people even
during the prehistoric times as evidenced by archaeological excavations.
Arrival of immigrants from North India was said to have taken
place around 483 BC. Repeated invasions by South Indians beginning
in 205 BC, transfer of kingdom from Anuradhapura to Polonnaruwa
in the 11th century, the arrival of European colonizers - the
Portuguese- in 1505 A.D., followed by the Dutch in 1656 and the
British in 1796, the fall of the last kingdom of Kandy into the
hands of the British in 1815 and the achievement of independence
in 1948 are some important landmarks in Sri Lanka’s history.
These events, in one way or the other, have influenced Sri Lanka
in modern times and probably will influence the island in the
future as well.
Another important aspect, which relates to our
topic today, is what we have done or some times failed to do in
the past, that have impacted on today’s Sri Lanka. The time
of independence from Britain would be a reasonable marker, to
understand why we are here today and not somewhere else.
Policies that were positive
Let me focus on how some measures we took and
policies we adopted then have impacted positively on today’s
Sri Lanka.
Democracy
You know that Sri Lanka is a democracy. However,
a little known fact is that Sri Lanka was the first country in
Asia, where the seeds of democracy were sown. That happened three
quarters of a century ago in 1931, when the Universal Adult Suffrage
was introduced to the island, while it was still a British colony.
Despite the passage of time, we have been able to nourish democracy
and hold periodic multi-party elections at local government and
national levels.
Human Development
Since independence Sri Lanka invested heavily
on human development at considerable cost to the state coffers.
Consequently, despite being a middle-income country, with a per
capita income of $1197 GDP, our social indicators are similar
to some countries which have much higher income levels.
Sri Lanka is perhaps among the very few countries
in the world, which, since 1944, has provided education from the
entry level at the age of 5 years up to and including the university
level, free of charge. In addition, school children are provided
with free textbooks and uniforms and needy university undergraduates
are provided with scholarships. This has resulted in the creation
of a level playing field for children to pursue education irrespective
of their social or economic background. This policy has resulted
in a literacy rate exceeding 90%. However, it has also contributed
to unemployment among educated youth and their marginalization,
which has contributed to two insurgencies in the south and the
north and east.
As with education, health services are also free
at government hospitals, whether the patients seek emergency treatment
or have to undergo complicated surgery. The result of this policy
is that Sri Lanka has been able to push life expectancy to 70
and to 72 years for males and females respectively. Our infant
mortality rate is a low 11.2 per 1000 births and maternal mortality
rate is 17 per 100,000.
A Robust Economy
Considering that Sri Lanka has been a victim
of a vicious separatist armed conflict for almost 30 years, it
is refreshing to note that our economy has been performing commendably.
According to current figures, the economy grew at the rate of
8.3% and 7.6 % during the first two quarters, with the annual
average for 2006 expected at 7.6 %.
It should be noted is that this commendable growth
is despite the economically debilitating armed conflict which
has been stepped up since December 2005 by the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam, also known as the Tamil Tigers. This growth reflects
not only the resilience of the economy in the aftermath of the
devastating tsunami and in the midst of escalating oil prices,
but also the potential the country holds for development in an
atmosphere of peace.
Policies that went wrong
Despite these positive indicators, it can be
said that Sri Lanka is where it is today as a result of certain
policy decisions taken by successive administrations since independence.
The language policy of the 1950s and the university admission
policy in the 1970s were some measures taken by former administrations
to address historic injustices faced by the Sinhala community
under colonial rule and those living in underdeveloped areas of
the country, respectively. However, in the course of implementation,
these measures adversely affected the Tamil community, who had
hitherto enjoyed privileges especially in the field of education
and employment, which created the first fissures that contributed
to dividing the two communities, the results of which are now
being experienced by the country.
Similarly, as many newly independent countries,
Sri Lanka too wished to be separated from the umbilical cord that
connected the country with its former colonial master, the United
Kingdom. In that process, two Republican constitutions were adopted
in 1972 and 1978, which unfortunately further alienated the Tamil
community.
What was more ironic was how the second Republican
constitution failed to meet an important objective. Focusing on
the undesirability of the massive majority it won at the 1977
general election, which decimated the opposition, the new administration
decided to move away from the first-past-the-post to proportional
representation. While this measure met some objectives, the result
of that exercise was that no political party was able to win a
comfortable majority good enough to form a government, resulting
in having to rely on coalition governments supported by several
small parties. This prevented successive administrations from
taking crucial decisions relating to pressing national issues,
such as introducing essential constitutional changes to address
the problems of the minorities and moving away from the Executive
Presidential system, as desired by some, due to the inability
to come up with a 2/3 majority in parliament.
Another shortcoming was the inability of successive
governments to address policy issues in their right perspective.
Instead, the party, which is in the opposition that is in US parlance
the minority party, as a rule of thumb opposed whatever that was
proposed by the ruling party. This practice, in the absence of
bipartisan support on major issues as in the US, has made it impossible
for Sri Lanka to address critical issues as they emerge and move
on to the task of nation building.
The Armed Conflict
When we speak of Sri Lanka today, our minds generally
go to news items and editorials that dominate the day. During
the month of October there have been many such editorials and
news reporting. Some editorials referred to issues concerning
Sri Lanka with captions such as “Asia’s unending war”
(Boston Globe of October 22), “Tiger terror”, (The
Times of October 19), “Targeting the Tamil Tigers”
(Washington Times of October 18) etc. These referred to issues
such as the ethnic conflict, terrorism, self-determination, Tamil
homeland, aspirations and grievances of Tamils, human rights violations
etc.
I would like to begin by saying that these are
issues, which require in-depth knowledge of the topic, and not
superficial understanding of the subjects. The time available
is not sufficient for me to address all the issues, but I shall
focus on some major ones.
Is it really an ethnic conflict?
I would like to point out that the first mistake
observers of Sri Lanka make today is trying to generalize the
conflict and attach convenient labels to help those who do not
know the subject. For example, they see the conflict as an “ethnic
conflict” between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils.
Some compound the situation by pointing out that the conflict
is between Sinhala Buddhists and Hindu Tamils and others trying
to explain that Sinhalese are descendents of fair skinned Aryans
and the Tamils as dark skinned Dravidians! This is what we call
stereotyping.
First, the Sri Lankan conflict is not a religious
issue between Buddhists and Hindus. In Sri Lanka, there are Hindu
places of worship cheek by jowl with Buddhist temples. Moreover,
there are Hindu places of worship such as Kataragama in the Southern
Province and Munneswaram Temple in the Western Province, which
are places of veneration for the Buddhists as well. On the other
hand, there are Buddhist places of worship such as the Sri Pada
or to use the English name the Adam’s Peak, which is a Buddhist
place of worship, or the Kandy Perahera, a Buddhist religious
pageant, in which Hindus participate.
The census of 1981 provides a clear picture of
the distribution of the population in Sri Lanka, which consisted
of 74% Sinhalese, 12.7% Sri Lankan Tamils, 5.5 % Indian Tamils
and 7.0% Sri Lankan Moors (Muslims) and 0.7% of others. However,
what we have to understand is that the Indian Tamils, who live
the Central Province, are a distinct group from the Sri Lankan
Tamils who live predominantly in the North and the East of the
country. What is more important is that they are not in truck
with the Tamil Tigers, who are conducting an armed conflict demanding
a separate state. Moreover, elected representatives of the Indian
Tamils, as a rule of thumb, form part of the administration and
hold cabinet portfolios.
The second aspect is that the conflict is not
between the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sinhalese based on ethnicity
unless fanned by politics. While Sri Lankan Tamils live predominantly
in the North and to a lesser extent in the East, a large percentage
of them currently live in other parts of the country, along with
the Sinhalese, Muslims and others, so much so, according to the
latest census, a greater percentage of Sri Lankan Tamils live
in areas other than the North and the East. The reason for this
demographic change is, while a considerable number of Tamils left
the country after 1983, in the recent past, large numbers of Sri
Lankan Tamils have voted with their feet and left the areas dominated
by Tamil Tigers, who call themselves “the sole representatives
of the Tamil people.”
This being the situation, how accurate is it
to describe the conflict as an ethnic conflict? My response is,
it is not an ethnic conflict but a separatist war waged by an
armed group using terrorism as a tactic to achieve its political
goal. It is a fact that the Tamil Tigers have been engaged in
an armed conflict with the democratically elected governments
since 1976, with a view to establishing a separate mono-ethnic
state in the North and the East, which comprises 1/3 of the land
mass of the country in the name of Sri Lankan Tamils.
LTTE and Terrorism
The Tamil Tigers introduce themselves as a national
liberation movement. Irrespective of labels, one must look into
the modus operandi of the organization, to understand what they
really are. The editorial of The London Times of October 19, 2006
speaks of the Tigers as “terrorists.” The Washington
Times editorial of October 18 reminds us that the US has classified
the Tamil Tigers as a terrorist organization. That was not a unique
decision. The Tamil Tigers earned the classification of a terrorist
group by hard work and sheer persistence. In May 1991 they assassinated
former Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi by employing a female suicide
bomber and New Delhi responded by classifying them as a terrorist
organization. The US classified the Tamil Tigers as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization in October 1997. In February 2001, four
years after the US classification, UK followed suit. This year,
Canada, after much soul-searching, imposed a ban on them. That
policy decision was followed by the 25 member EU under the EU
regulations providing for the designation of terrorist organizations.
Meanwhile, Australia too has taken measures to designate the LTTE
under regulations giving effect to Security Council Resolution
1373 to curb financing of terrorism. We must ask why, most of
these countries, being Western liberal democracies, decided to
classify the Tamil Tigers as a terrorist organization? As I said
earlier, they have worked hard to earn that classification.
In case there is a disagreement, I would like
to point out that while there is no universally accepted definition
of international terrorism, the Department of State describes
international terrorism as “involving citizens or the territory
of more than one country”, and the term "terrorism"
as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine
agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” (“Country
Reports on Terrorism” published annually has based its definition,
as contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656
f (d).
Needless to say the Tamil Tigers perfectly fit
in to the description.
Self Determination
Tamil Tigers, who claim to be a national liberation
movement, are seeking the right to self-determination. We are
all aware that the right to self-determination is enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations as a universal right, which
has also been embodied in the International Covenants on Human
Rights, as well as in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in the General Assembly
resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. However, it must be
emphasized that none of these international instruments provide
for or support the recourse to terrorism in pursuit of self-determination,
and to secede from a state, which has already attained independence
thereby in violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
We have seen numerous instances, where terrorist
groups have suggested that terrorism is permissible to achieve
self-determination. Some terrorist groups also try to support
their claim by making partial reference to the 1970 Declaration
on Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States on the same
issue. The declaration does not in any way justify secession in
violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent
states. It is pertinent to point out that having deliberated on
the matter extensively, the Vienna Declaration of 1993, while
recognizing that all peoples have the right to self-determination,
declared “Taking into account the particular situation
of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or
foreign occupation, the World Conference on Human Rights recognizes
the right of peoples to take any legitimate action, in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations”. I need not
labour the point that resorting to terrorism is neither “legitimate”
nor “in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”
Homeland Issue
The demand for a “traditional homeland”
for Tamils or when it suits them for Tamil speaking peoples has
been a rallying cry of the Tamil Tigers. Others have repeated
or supported this demand without proper understanding or an accurate
assessment of the ground situation in Sri Lanka.
With a view to understanding the demand of the
Tigers, let us look at the facts, for which one must have an understanding
of history, geography, distribution of people, politics etc.,
of the country.
First, as I said earlier, the size of the country
is app. 25,000 sq. miles with a population of nearly 20 million.
Second, the demand of the Tamil Tigers is for
the entirety of two provinces i.e. the Northern and the Eastern
Provinces, which were temporarily merged by an executive order
of the President, subsequent to signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka
Agreement in 1987.
Third, the temporarily merged Northern and Eastern
Provinces cover app. 1/3 of the landmass of the country and 2/3
of its coastline.
Fourth, over 50% of Sri Lankan Tamils live outside
the Northern and the Eastern Provinces. In short, translated into
figures, the demand the Tamil Tigers is to have 1/3 of the land
mass of the country for fewer than 6% of Sri Lankan Tamils currently
living in the North and the East.
Fifth, while the Northern Province is predominantly
populated by Tamils, due to the systematic ethnic cleansing of
the Sinhalese and Muslims from that province by the Tamil Tigers,
in post 1983 period and particularly in June 1990 respectively,
population distribution of the Eastern Province is quite different.
According to the 1981 census, the Tamils formed 40% of the population
in the Eastern Province, Muslims 32% and Sinhalese 25%. One needs
not to be a mathematician to calculate that non-Tamils form the
majority of the Eastern Province. Yet the demand is that the Eastern
Province, irrespective of its demography, should form part of
their traditional homeland. The Tamil Tigers are vehemently against
holding of a referendum, as provided in paragraph 2.3 of the Indo-Lanka
Accord, to consult the people in the Eastern Province with regard
to the merger.
I can go on, but let me digress here a little
and pose a few questions and at the same time provide answers
to facilitate those who have not quite grasped the situation.
First, leaving the Northern Province aside, when
did the Eastern Province become the “traditional homeland”
of Tamils? According to Webster’s Deluxe Unabridged Dictionary,
one explanation of “tradition” is “a long established
custom or practice that has the effect of an unwritten law”.
If tradition is something that has been long established, what
about those practices that have been “established longer”?
Those who have studied history of the country know that greater
part of the present day Eastern Province, during the historical
period, was inhabited by the Sinhalese and later by Tamils and
Muslims. If one wishes to be fair, it can be said that the Eastern
Province was inhabited by the aborigines of the island during
the prehistoric period even before the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims
made that part of the island their home and some of their descendants
continue to live there to date. The claim of Tamil Tigers for
a two nation theory has been based on a misleading reference made
in a minute by Hugh Cleghorn, Colonial Secretary in June 1799,
with regard to the areas supposedly inhabited by Tamils bordered
by Chilaw on the western coast and river Walawe in southern coast
during that period. If what he had reported was true, we have
to accept that Sinhalese people originated in Siam - present day
Thailand - and Jaffna was predominantly inhabited at that time
by people of Moorish extraction! Such was his lack of knowledge
of the country served by him briefly when the British took over
maritime areas of then Ceylon from the Dutch. Sri Lankan Tamils
began to populate the Eastern Province in significant numbers
during the early British times, and even then they inhabited only
the costal areas of the East, whereas the Moors made the East
their home during the Kandyan King Senarath’s time, following
the expulsion of Moors from the coastal areas by the Portuguese
1626. It is a fact that Sinhalese and Tamils lived together even
in the Northern Province in the historical past as evidenced by
archaeology, historical inscriptions and lore. Should we therefore
not conclude, that the island being a multi-ethnic society is
the traditional homeland of Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors (Muslims),
Burghers etc.
Second, was the Northern, or for that matter,
the Eastern Province demarcated on an ethnic basis by the colonial
masters? The answer is no. When the British demarcated these two
provinces in 1833 in terms of the Colebrook-Cameron Reforms, or
when the borders of the 9 provinces which exist to date were demarcated
in 1889, they were done solely for administrative purposes and
not on ethnic considerations.
Third, what did the Indo-Lanka Agreement say
about the so-called homeland? Was it by mistake the 1987 Agreement
between India and Sri Lanka in paragraph 1.4 recognized that “the
Northern and the Eastern Provinces have been areas of historical
habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all
times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic
groups”. Thus, is it not clear that in that province
lived “Tamil speaking peoples”, namely the Sri Lankan
Tamils and Sri Lankan Moors with other ethnic groups, which included
the Sinhalese? How can then the Eastern Province become the sole
preserve of the Tamils?
Fourth, should the rights of the Sinhalese and
the Moors living in the Eastern Province be sacrificed in fulfilling
the aspirations of the Tamil Tigers to have a traditional homeland?
If for a moment, we forget about the recent history, that is when
the Tamils came to populate the Eastern Province in significant
numbers, and look at the current population distribution in that
province, we see that non-Tamils surpass the Tamils by a ratio
of 6 to 4. The question we should ask is, by promoting a separate
homeland for the Tamils, as demanded by Tamil Tigers, who are
non-democratic, tolerate no dissention and promote a mono ethnic
one party state, are they not attempting to deliver not only the
Tamils in Eastern Province, but also the Moors and Sinhalese to
a fascist dictatorship?
Fifth, what about the Tamils living in other
parts of the country, if a Tamil homeland were to be established
by Tamil Tigers? As I have pointed out, a majority of Sri Lankan
Tamils now live outside the Northern and Eastern Provinces. If
there is an agreement to establish a homeland for the Tamils comprising
the Northern and the Eastern Provinces, how do the promoters of
the proposal, plan to look after the “aspirations”
and “grievances” of the majority of the Sri Lankan
Tamil population currently living outside these two provinces?
Do they support a mass migration, just like the one that took
place in the Indian sub continent during the partition in 1947
and deliver the hapless Tamils, who left the two provinces to
escape the atrocities of the Tamil Tigers, back to the grips of
the Tigers for a second round of suffering? Or on the other hand,
is there another formula to address their grievances and aspirations,
while they continue to remain in areas other than the Northern
and Eastern Provinces? You will note that I have not spoken of
the aspiration of the Tamils in the Eastern Province to be free
of the Tamil Tigers, who are from the Northern Province.
Tamil Grievances and Aspirations
When we discuss the conflict in Sri Lanka, we
also come across of two terminologies viz. ‘grievances and
‘aspirations’ of Tamils. Sometimes we use the adjective
‘legitimate’ to highlight the two issues.
First of all, I have to make it clear that as
human beings we all have aspirations. We aspire to do well in
our lives; we aspire to our children excelling in studies and
succeed in life, and the list can go on and on. Most of the time
our aspirations can be legitimate; but then, some of us could
also aspire to achieve certain other things, which are not quite
legitimate. What is important is that, it is not only the Tamil
community that have aspirations. Other communities too have their
own aspirations and legitimate aspirations too, which may be similar
to or different from those of Tamils.
The fact of the matter is, the administration
has accepted in good faith to address the legitimate aspirations
of the Tamil people. But nobody has listed or gone beyond such
statements to list or examine what these aspirations are, whether
they are legitimate or not, and more importantly, if they are
justified, whether those give reason for creation of a separate
state.
I could say the same thing about grievances too,
but to a lesser extent. For example, earlier I acknowledged that
the Tamil community had certain grievances resulting from the
language policy adopted in the 1950s and the university entrance
policy in the 1970s. The fact is that the issues relating to the
language policy has been addressed when Tamil was made an official
language along with Sinhalese, through amendments to the 1987
constitution. Yet, we have to acknowledge that still there are
certain grievances experienced by Tamils, due to the practical
shortcomings in putting the language policy in to practice. Likewise,
the issues relating to university entrance have also been addressed
and today the problem is that the two universities established
in the Northern and the Eastern Provinces function sporadically
due to the politicization of those educational institutions by
the Tamil Tigers. Remember I said earlier that the financial responsibility
of university education is borne by the state, and that being
the situation we cannot admit all those who obtain pass marks.
That is a problem faced by all communities – Sinhalese,
Tamils as well as Moors. I admit that there are other grievances,
such as the land issue faced by Tamils as well as others, which
need to be addressed in good faith.
But the question that needs to be answered is
whether the only remedy available for addressing the grievances
and aspirations of Tamils is by radically changing the structure
of the state to create a separate state. If that is the case,
how could Sri Lanka address the aspirations and grievances of
the other minorities, the Sri Lanka Moors and Indian Tamils? Are
we talking here something else, namely decentralizing the administration
and or sharing of power between the centre and periphery to facilitate
people living in those areas, to be masters of their destiny?
The next question is should that be done on the basis of ethnicity
or on a geographical basis, democratically or in an arbitrary
manner without consulting the people?
Southern Consensus
Needless to say that any agreement reached to
devolve or share administrative power should be done through a
democratic process. Such units must be established having consulted
the people living there through democratic means, such as multiparty
elections or referendums.
It must be emphasized that President Mahinda
Rajapaksa has gone on record not once but several times that he
is in favour of granting maximum possible devolution. It is with
that commitment in view earlier this year; he took steps to establish
an All Party Representations Committee (APRC), open to all democratically
elected parties in parliament. Unfortunately, several parties
have so far not joined that process. Moreover, a panel comprising
legal and constitutional experts has been established to advice
the APRC. The intention of this exercise is to build consensus
among political parties in the parliament on the extent of devolution
that can be legally and democratically granted to the people in
the North and the East. It is our hope that this process would
result in working out a comprehensive framework for maximum devolution
of power and to address the grievances of all minorities. Among
the proposals that are being examined are modalities for greater
power sharing between the centre and periphery, including the
representation of the periphery in the law making process at the
centre, such as through the establishment of a Second Chamber
comprising representatives elected by the peripheral units. That
is the democratic way of governance - decisions through consultation
to arrive at consensus.
In this context, the October 23 historical agreement
between the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, the majority party in the
ruling coalition, and the major opposition party the United National
Party (i.e. the minority party in the U.S. political system),
can be described as a harbinger for evolving such a consensus
through the APRC process.
Negotiations with the LTTE
It will be fair, I suppose, to expect the LTTE
to undergo a metamorphosis, so that it will also transform itself
to a democratic entity as several other Tamil militant groups
did after 1987. In fact, some former militants now hold cabinet
portfolios and one is entrusted with the task of regional development.
However, those who have studied the conflict
of Sri Lanka would notice that the Tamil Tigers engaged in negotiations
with successive administrations on 5 different occasions, namely
in 1985, 1987, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2002/2003. On all those occasions,
they walked away from the negotiating table to wage war and on
three occasions employed suicide bombers to kill those who were
responsible for taking them to the negotiating table and succeeded
on two occasions. More recently, in April 2006, having agreed
to meet in Geneva, they refused to proceed to the venue, and in
May, having gone all the way to Oslo, refused to engage in talks
with the government negotiators on a flimsy excuse. They have
adopted a similar tactic last week in Geneva.
Despite their intransigent behaviour, the peace
facilitator Norway, and other Co-Chairs - the US, Japan and the
European Union, and the Secretary General of the UN together with
many others have encouraged the two sides to re-engage in negotiations.
In the case of the US, it has taken the position, as explained
by Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns, who does not mince
his words, that "The US does not recognize the LTTE.
We don’t deal with them, we don’t support them, we
are extremely critical of them…we have no sympathy whatsoever
for the Tamil Tigers." Yet he urged the Government to
negotiate with Tamil Tigers.
The international position on negotiations with
the LTTE can best be described as seemingly contradictory but
conditioned by circumstances. In the first instance, there is
a strong feeling here in the US and elsewhere, that one should
not deal with terrorists. Yet there is general support, if not
urging, that the Sri Lanka Government should engage in negotiations
with the LTTE. Is this due to the claim by the Tamil Tigers that
they are the “sole representatives of the Tamil People”
or due to the fact that they dominate certain areas of the north
and the east and holding a vice-like grip on the Tamil people
to the extent that separating the people from the LTTE is not
a feasible exercise? On the other hand, is it due to the fact
that the Government has so far not come up with a workable proposal
for devolution or sharing of power with the Tamils? How come the
international community have overlooked the need to support and
empower those Tamil political parties, which are democratic and
are at the receiving end by the Tamil Tigers?
There is general agreement within and outside
Sri Lanka that the conflict in Sri Lanka cannot be resolved by
continuing with the armed conflict. The way out of the impasse
is through negotiation. However, to think that objective could
be achieved through negotiations only with Tamil Tigers does not
seem to reflect reality. The five instances of negotiations since
1985 and the last three experiences in Geneva and Oslo are sufficient
to conclude that the vision of the Tigers is nothing but a separate
state. This is confirmed by the well-documented thinking of the
leader of the organization, that a separate state should not come
on a platter either. The Tamils have to fight to realise that
objective. In fact his call to his supporters was, if he deviated
from the goal of a separate state, they have the right to kill
him.
It is exactly that goal they are pursuing right
now, which exercise was articulated by the leader of the organization
last November as follows:
“The new government should come forward
soon with a reasonable political framework that will satisfy
the political aspirations of the Tamil people. This is our urgent
and final appeal. If the new government rejects our urgent appeal,
we will, next year, in solidarity with our people, intensify
our struggle for self-determination, our struggle for national
liberation to establish self-government in our homeland.”
I should try to explain the situation for the
sake of clarity. During the 2002/2003 negotiations the two sides
met on 6 different times in various cities of the world from Bangkok
to Hakone with Oslo and Berlin in between. I speak, on those meetings
with some knowledge having attended all of them. At none of these
negotiating sessions was it possible to focus on substantive issues,
as at each session the LTTE dodged dealing with core issues on
the guise that they need to focus on the “existential”
problems of the Tamil civilians. However, in December 2002, when
they were urged by the facilitator to compromise, the LTTE delegation
agreed to:
“ ..explore a solution founded on
the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical
habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal
structure within a united Sri Lanka. The parties acknowledged
that the solution has to be acceptable to all communities.
Guided by this objective, the parties agreed
to initiate discussions on substantive political issues such
as, but not limited to:
- Power-sharing between the centre and
the region, as well as within the centre;
- Geographical region;
- Human Rights protection;
- Political and administrative mechanism;
- Public finance;
- Law and order”.
The fact that agreement ended up being still
born is seen from what happened since then ending with the “temporary
suspension of the negotiations” in April 2003 by the Tigers,
and the demand for a federal structure been elevated to a ‘confederal’
structure in the ISGA proposals of October that year. It is in
this context some believe that transformation of the confederal
structure to a separate state will be a matter of time. Ahead
of the October 28-29 round of talks in Geneva, political leader
of LTTE, Suppiah Thamilselvan has gone on record that it was not
the intention of the organisation to focus on substantive issues
until the restoration of normalcy has taken place and only after
that they will be able to talk about people's political aims and
aspirations. Having assured the international community that they
will go to Geneva without conditions, Tamil Tigers have insisted
in Geneva that future participation in the negotiations will depend
on the opening of the A9 highway to the north. This is very much
like the position the Tamil Tigers adopted during the 2002/2003
negotiations.
Let me conclude my presentation with some steps
that need to be taken, if we were to focus on Sri Lanka tomorrow
rather than today.
I. There should be a commitment on the part of
parties to the conflict that the conflict can be resolved only
through negotiations and that it must be a democratic solution.
II. Parties should address all issues affecting
all minorities, including the Tamils.
III. The APRC process should be fast tracked
with a view to reaching consensus on political settlement within
the shortest possible period.
IV. The latest round of negotiations commenced
in Geneva on October 28 should, within a specific time frame,
focus on substantive matters with a view to ending the armed conflict
and achieving a political settlement.
V. In the process of negotiations for a political
settlement, the Government should not overlook the moderate Tamil
parties and Muslims in the parliament.
VI. Following the stance taken by the LTTE in
Geneva last week, the international community should encourage,
failing which, pressurize, the LTTE not to leave the negotiating
table under spurious pretexts.
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