SRI LANKA PEACE PROCESS: ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING
BY
JAYANTHA DHANAPALA
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE SECRETARIAT FOR COORDINATING THE PEACE
PROCESS (SCOPP) AND
SENIOR ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT OF SRI LANKA
8TH SEPTEMBER 2005
Thank you for the privilege of addressing this
Congressional gathering.
It is a pleasure to be back in Washington, DC
- a city I first visited as an 18 year old and where later I served
six and a half years as a professional diplomat including a term
as Ambassador of Sri Lanka.
I am here today at a sad and sombre time for
both our countries. I would like to express my deep sympathy and
sincere solidarity with the people of the United States and especially
with those in Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi, who have experienced
death and destruction due to hurricane Katrina. In my own country,
the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26th last year took over
thirty thousand lives, displaced one million people and caused
enormous destruction to infrastructure, property and livelihoods.
Sri Lanka is yet recovering from this natural disaster of unprecedented
magnitude, but the task of recovery and reconstruction has been
made easier by the assistance so generously provided by the international
community, including the government and people of the USA. In
our own modest way Sri Lanka has made a donation to the victims
of Katrina as a gesture symbolizing a spontaneous bonding between
peoples in humanitarian crises as well as the close and traditional
ties between two democracies.
I am here to speak to you on the “Sri
Lanka Peace Process and the Role of the International Community”,
at a crucial moment in Sri Lanka’s peace process, less than
a month after the premeditated and diabolically planned assassination
of Sri Lanka’s former Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar,
which on the basis of the investigations carried so far, unmistakably
points to the culpability of the LTTE. Evidence so far gathered
shows that days prior to the assassination LTTE cadres were apprehended
carrying out surveillance on the Minister’s private residence,
the accomplices of the assassins were carefully cultivated at
different layers of the organization, duress had been used to
force them to cooperate and that in May 2005 they had travelled
to Kilinochchi and met the LTTE hierarchy including one Charles
- an intelligence chief of the LTTE responsible for operations
in the south of Sri Lanka.
Let me begin with the Government of Sri Lanka’s
(GOSL’s) policy in relation to the peace process and its
engagement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) before
the assassination of Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar. That policy has
had elements of continuity through the two decades of conflict
spanning changes of government through democratic elections. More
recently, a firm commitment to the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) of
2002 with its Nordic-staffed monitoring mission; the objective
of a politically negotiated solution; the retention of the Royal
Norwegian Government as the facilitator; adherence to the principles
of the Oslo Decision of 2 December 2002, where the GOSL and the
LTTE signed an agreement to explore a solution based on a federal
structure within a united Sri Lanka; the Tokyo Declaration; and
the infrastructural support of the Peace Secretariat, were the
elements of continuity between the previous United National Front
Government and the United People’s Freedom Alliance Government
elected in April 2004. At the same time engagement with the LTTE
was based on the expectation that this militant group would abandon
the terrorism and violence of the past and would gradually move
into the democratic mainstream in the same way as other groups
including minority Tamil rebel groups had done in Sri Lanka and
other groups elsewhere in the world, have done. Consequently confidence
building measures were unilaterally pursued by the GOSL without
demanding any reciprocal gestures. Interaction with foreign governments
by the LTTE was encouraged in the hope that this exposure would
broaden the thinking of a group wedded to a weapon-based culture.
The Kadirgamar assassination is the worst of
a series of ceasefire violations. It is the most high profile
assassination since the ceasefire came into force and is no doubt
an outrage and a grave setback to the peace process. It is also
one of hundreds of killings carried out by the LTTE after the
CFA was signed, as part of its unabated policy to eliminate all
political dissent. Democratic Tamil leaders such as Mr. A. Amirthalingam
former leader of the TULF and Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam, TULF M.P.,
and Human Rights Activist, who were seen by the LTTE as traitors
or opponents of their cause were eliminated. While the LTTE is
internationally notorious for their signature style of political
killings - the suicide bomber - it is not their only modus operandi
for carrying out assassinations. Pistol gangs and snipers are
also part of their tactical repertoire. Investigations into the
assassination of Mr. Kadirgamar so far have clearly established
a direct link to the LTTE. The GOSL will act expeditiously to
conclude investigations, apprehend those responsible and bring
them to justice.
Despite this dastardly act, the GOSL will continue
to adhere to and respect the CFA. As a responsible democratic
government committed to the rule of law and human rights, the
GOSL does not want to plunge the country back into armed conflict.
The CFA has saved countless lives and prevented the wanton destruction
of property. It has facilitated the movement of people, goods
and services from the North and the East to the South and vice
versa. Despite reports to the contrary, it has brought about a
peace dividend for people particularly in the North and the East.
But after the Kadirgamar assassination it cannot be business as
usual. We are therefore engaged in a policy review, which we would
like to share with the international community and seek cooperation
in its implementation.
The areas in which we think policy review is
necessary are:
- The more effective functioning of the CFA
- Ensuring the practice of democratic freedoms by all Tamils
and Muslims in the LTTE dominated areas of the North and the
East
- A serious effort to stop child recruitment by the LTTE
- The urgent need to address human rights issues involved in
ceasefire violations
- The continuation of development and humanitarian assistance
to the people of the North and the East
- The urgent need for sanctions by the international community
for persistent violations of the CFA
In all of these areas, we seek the understanding
and active co-operation of the international community in general
and the USA in particular.
(a) Reviewing the CFA
There is, first of all, a need to review the
functioning of the CFA that is now far more urgent than before.
In the aftermath of the assassination, the President of Sri Lanka
wrote to the Prime Minister of Norway, requesting “an urgent
meeting between the government and the LTTE…. to review
the practical functioning of the ceasefire with a view to preventing
further killings and other violations". The GOSL has been
calling for a review of the implementation of the CFA for quite
sometime, a request endorsed by the SLMM but steadfastly resisted
by the LTTE until they found it expedient to divert the recent
outrage and opprobrium expressed by the international community
in the aftermath of the Kadirgamar assassination by agreeing to
these talks.
The GOSL expectation is that these talks will
be technical level discussions between representatives of the
armed forces of the government on the one part and the LTTE on
the other on the practical functioning of the CFA with a view
to preventing further killings. I have just been informed that
the LTTE has rejected a Norwegian proposal that the talks be held
at the Bandaranaike International Airport, which the government
had accepted.
(b) Democratic freedoms
The GOSL also recognizes that in the long run
a mere review of the CFA may not be sufficient to halt violations
of the CFA. According to statistics maintained by the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission, which monitors the CFA, up to August 2005
the LTTE has a record of 3113 violations of the CFA as against
141 by the Government, which represents a ratio of 22 to 1. I
would like to highlight for you the qualitative nature of these
violations. Political killings are merely a symptom of LTTE’s
intolerance of dissent. The basic right to express one’s
opinion, to associate, to engage in political activity, to vote
freely - are the foundations of a democracy. More than three years
after the CFA it does not appear that the LTTE is able to change
and accept the imperative for democratization and the fact that
it is not the ‘sole representative of the Tamil people’.
Similarly, more than three years after the CFA, Tamil people,
or the representatives of the Tamil political parties, who express
independent opinions or engage in political activity outside the
framework laid down by the LTTE are still on a death sentence.
In contrast, the CFA in Art. 1.13 allows LTTE cadres to engage
in political work in GOSL controlled areas and the GOSL has also
recognized LTTE’s right to set up political offices in these
areas.
International pressure on the LTTE is needed
to allow other parties to conduct political activities in LTTE
controlled areas.
(c) Child Combatants
A majority of CFA violations (54%) relate to
child recruitment, in blatant disregard of the undertaking the
LTTE has given to the United Nations in 1998 and the UNICEF Action
Program of mid 2003.
On the question of child recruitment, the Sri
Lankan government welcomes the UN Security Council Resolution
1612(2005), which establishes a monitoring and reporting mechanism
on the use of child soldiers, and will work closely with UNICEF
to give effect to this resolution.
(d) Human Rights
These violations, whether they are political
killings or child recruitment, are carried out with impunity even
in the face of international condemnation as there are no sanctions
against such violations. The SLMM as conceived in the CFA has
a ‘naming and shaming’ role. Furthermore, given that
a majority of CFA violations fall into the category of violations
of a human rights nature, rather than of a military nature, the
SLMM is inadequately equipped to deal with such violations, as
they are mainly staffed by personnel with a military/police background.
There is also now a consensus emerging among
civil society in Sri Lanka that a separate human rights agreement
may be necessary to stem the tide of human rights violations by
the LTTE. Human rights missions in El Salvador and Guatemala demonstrate
the crucial role of promoting and protecting human rights in rebuilding
trust and fostering a climate of reconciliation after an armed
conflict. In Guatemala the human rights verification mission (MINUGUA)
was deployed in 1994, two years in advance of the final peace
agreement signed by the Government and the Opposition. The National
Peace Accord was signed in South Africa September 1991, long before
agreement was reached on a new constitution for SA.
In Sri Lanka, it was understood that the process
of negotiations for a solution to the armed conflict will be a
long one, before ultimate human rights commitments are agreed
upon and included as part of constitutional arrangements. But
the need to address human rights issues in the interim was recognized
by both parties during the fourth and fifth rounds of the peace
talks. Accordingly, the two parties agreed to invite Mr. Ian Martin
to act as an international human rights advisor and to draw up
a road map on human rights issues relating to the peace process,
which could form an agreement between the two parties.
However, with the unilateral suspension of the
peace talks in April 2003, it has not been able to make any progress
on the road map. Mr. Ian Martin is expected to visit Sri Lanka
again this year, and it is our hope that we will be able to recommence
the discussion relating to addressing human rights as a matter
of priority as the continuation of these violations will seriously
jeopardize the future of our peace process.
The GOSL has also commenced a dialogue with the
UN on the issue of addressing human rights within the peace process.
Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Advisor to the SG was in Sri Lanka
just before my departure to the US to discuss a possible UN role
in this regard.
This discussion on the CFA and its limitations
has, I believe, already highlighted the considerable role played
by the international community in the peace process in Sri Lanka
and the potential for other actors. The Royal Norwegian Government,
which facilitated the CFA in 2001, continues to act as the facilitator
and the CFA is monitored by the Nordic staffed SLMM. Other international
actors have also supported Sri Lanka’s peace process through
economic assistance and a variety of diplomatic tools.
(e) Development and Humanitarian Assistance
The international community has provided enormous
support to the peace process in Sri Lanka through economic assistance
to rebuild the North and the East affected by the armed conflict.
Since the CFA was signed, international donor conferences were
held in Oslo and Tokyo, as well as a preparatory meeting in Washington
to mobilize political and economic support for the peace process.
At the Tokyo Donor Conference held in June 2003, the international
community pledged $4.5 billion to support the GOSL's efforts to
address the immediate and long-term needs of the conflict-affected
North and the East. The US, EU, Norway and Japan, which were named
Co-Chairs to the Tokyo Donor Conference, have continued to meet
to monitor progress in Sri Lanka’s peace process.
The Government through the Ministry of RRR has
been delivering this international humanitarian and development
assistance to the affected people of the North and the East, including
those in the uncleared areas of Mullaitivu and Killinochchi. I
am happy to say that this work has been done with the cooperation
of the LTTE, and as I mentioned earlier, people in the North and
the East have therefore benefited from the ceasefire, through
a peace dividend. Let me now identify some of the very specific
programmes being undertaken in the North and the East, since the
ceasefire was signed.
- The RRR Ministry with donor assistance is at present implementing
an impressive number of projects, which include resettlement
of internally displaced persons and assistance to host communities,
rehabilitation of basic physical infrastructure such as roads,
irrigation programmes, power, and communication facilities as
well as rebuilding of social and communal services such as health,
education, sanitation and judicial services. The CFA has also
enabled the return of a large number of refugees mainly from
India.
- The demining efforts undertaken by the Government together
with NGO’s have facilitated this resettlement of IDP’s
as well as reconstruction and rehabilitation work in the North
and the East. Consequent to the ceasefire agreement, a comprehensive
programme for demining is being coordinated and implemented
by the GOSL during the last 2 years. We are particularly appreciative
of the role of the U.S. in this programme.
- Perhaps as a direct result of these efforts, GDP in the Northern
and the Eastern Provinces has shown remarkable growth. According
to research done by the Economic Affairs Division of my office,
the highest GDP growth rates during the post-CFA period are
in the Northern Province (12.6% per annum) and in the Eastern
Province (10.1% per annum.), in contrast to other provinces
in Sri Lanka. The engine of growth in the North and the East
during the post-CFA has been the agricultural sector with the
industrial and service sectors also making useful contributions;
rice production in the North and the East has reached pre-conflict
levels and recorded a surplus during the last harvest. The North
has the lowest rate of unemployment - 5.8% as against 8.9% for
the national average.
- Furthermore, GOSL is looking at investment promotion strategies
specific to the conflict-affected areas and exploring ways of
improving the investment climate in general in the North and
the East. Attracting private-sector investment in troubled areas
is not easy and at present the government is negotiating a Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) facility to promote investment
in the North and the East. MIGA is the political risk insurance
arm of the World Bank, which promotes foreign direct investment
in developing countries by insuring against political risk and
by providing technical assistance.
While the international community also showed
a keen interest to support the Post Tsunami Operational Management
Structure (P-TOMS), which was agreed upon by the GOSL and the
LTTE for equitable allocation of donor funds, the implementation
of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has been delayed due
to a stay order on some provisions of the MOU by the Supreme Court,
relating to the Regional Committee and the Regional Fund set up
under the MOU. The Government has filed its written objections
to the case and will also vigorously argue that the MOU does neither
violate provisions of the Constitution nor governmental regulations,
when the case is taken up on the 12th of September.
Despite the delay in implementing the MOU on
P-TOMS, foreign economic assistance obtained for post tsunami
reconstruction work is being disbursed through the Ministry of
RRR and other line Ministries in order to bring relief to the
tsunami affected people in the North and the East. The role of
the UN agencies and the local and international NGOs remain significant
in these areas.
I must also emphasize that the GOSL will continue
its humanitarian and development work in the North and the East
as a matter of priority, irrespective of the progress made in
the peace process, as the people of the North and the East cannot
be penalized for the faults of the LTTE.
(f) Sanctions and Pressures
With the exception of the USA, UK, Australia
and India, which has banned the LTTE as a terrorist outfit, a
number of international governments have followed a policy of
constructive engagement with both parties to the conflict in Sri
Lanka. Constructive engagement with the LTTE has meant direct
interaction with the LTTE in Kilinochchi, on issues relevant to
the peace process, reconstruction and rehabilitating activities
and hosting LTTE delegations in their own countries. Since the
CFA, the LTTE has made several tours to Europe. The last tour
also included a visit to South Africa. In the past, the GOSL has
encouraged these visits, in the belief that it is a useful exercise
for the LTTE to learn about democracy, concepts of governance,
power sharing, federalism etc., to broaden their horizons and
that it will assist in their transformation from a terrorist outfit
to a democratic institution.
Foreign governments have also sought to make
public, their stance on issues related to the Sri Lanka peace
process through policy statements or statements of encouragement/condemnation
thereby influencing the actors and stakeholders in the conflict
in Sri Lanka. These diplomatic tools have however, made little
or no impact on the LTTE to either desist from violations of the
CFA or return to the negotiating table, which they left in April
2003.
Direct peace negotiations between the GOSL and
the LTTE that are critical in any peace process have been stalled
since April 2003. The six (6) rounds of peace talks yielded a
number of significant decisions such as the establishment of a
Committee for De-escalation and Normalization, a Gender Committee,
a Sub Committee for Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation
Needs, and the Oslo Decision signed by the two sides in December
2002, in which both parties agreed “to explore a solution
founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas
of historical habitation of the Tamil speaking peoples, based
on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka”. None
of these committees are now functioning and the Oslo decision
also remains a dead letter with the LTTE steadfastly refusing
to reiterate it publicly.
The stalemate over the reopening of negotiations
has revolved around whether the ISGA proposal by the LTTE alone
should be the only subject of the agenda as the LTTE has demanded
or whether all proposals for an interim authority should be discussed
as a prelude to a final settlement within the framework of the
Oslo decision, as the Government has proposed. This dispute over
the agenda probably conceals other factors. Since March 2004 a
dramatic split in the ranks of the LTTE has resulted in a murky
internecine war between the Karuna faction, a break away group
of the LTTE, and the Kilinochchi based LTTE.
In many ways, the international community has
been indulgent of the LTTE, subordinating democracy and human
rights to keep the peace process alive, rewarding the LTTE with
various incentives, in the hope that dialogue and engagement will
slowly democratize the organization. This however is no longer
a tenable policy.
The recent Kadirgamar assassination has thrown
up hard questions about the role of the international community
in Sri Lanka’s peace process. Both the Royal Norwegian Government
and the SLMM has had to perform a difficult task under extremely
difficult circumstances and the GOSL is extremely grateful to
them for the work they are doing to support peace in Sri Lanka.
Despite media criticism and widespread speculation, I must emphasize
here that the GOSL does not intend to replace Norway as facilitator.
The GOSL, however, believes that the international community has
an important role to play in supplementing the role of Norway
as facilitator by applying pressure on the LTTE.
This may be an opportune moment to undertake
a fundamental review or ‘redesign’ of the peace process
in Sri Lanka. GOSL’s discussions with representatives of
the international community in Colombo reveal that there is broad
agreement that we have to take a fresh look at the peace process.
The route of appeasement or the ‘carrot and more carrots’
approach, have not worked with the LTTE. Immediately after the
Kadirgamar assassination, the GOSL called for concerted international
action that is immediate and tangible against the LTTE, to include
not only those that have a bearing on the LTTE, but also its numerous
front organizations in many countries through which it continues
its reign of terror in Sri Lanka.
In the globalized world of today, the trajectory
of internal conflicts are often influenced by international developments
and pressures. Analysts of internal conflicts have concluded that
international involvement in internal conflicts is eventually
inevitable as a passive as well as an active factor. The question
is how to ensure such pressure is positive rather than negative.
President Chandrika Kumaratunga in a recent address
to the nation pointed out that, “Terrorism has become today,
the single most dominant global phenomenon. From New York to London,
the western world has begun to experience terrorism, which we
have for long suffered in Sri Lanka. Terrorism has been condemned
globally while its true nature is recognized and rejected. The
community of nations represented by the United Nations Organization
and its Security Council has now united to oppose terrorism practically
and effectively”.
The United States as a close friend of Sri Lanka,
and as a member of the Co-Chairs of the Tokyo Donor Conference,
has consistently supported a sanctions based approach to the LTTE,
and maintained that the US listing of the LTTE as a foreign terrorist
organization will remain in effect until it renounces terrorism
in word and deed.
Indeed it is the international safety net provided
by such a sanctions based approach that has allowed the GOSL to
continue to negotiate with the LTTE to find a peaceful solution
to the armed conflict in Sri Lanka. In order for the GOSL to be
able to talk to the LTTE without further alienating the peace
constituency in Sri Lanka, the international community must take
a tough stand against them. This will help move the peace process
forward.
I would like to conclude by saying that the impact
of the international community has been mixed in Sri Lanka’s
peace process. On the one hand it has had a positive impact on
the sustainability of the peace process through sustained interest
and economic support. It has however, not been particularly effective
in stemming the tide of grave ceasefire violations, insisting
on a resumption of talks or transforming the LTTE into a democratic
institution.
The next meeting of the Co-Chairs of the Tokyo
Donor Conference is scheduled for the 19th of September in New
York. It is an opportunity for the U.S. to continue to show leadership
at that meeting to ensure that acts of terrorism like the Kadirgamar
assassination would not go unpunished and that conditions for
human rights and democracy to flourish in all parts of Sri Lanka
would be created.
As Sri Lanka enters a democratic process of electing
a new President, the LTTE must be under no illusion that they
can get away by assassinating political leaders and resorting
to electoral malpractices in the areas controlled by them as they
have done on previous occasions.
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