HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC HOLDS HEARING
ON UNREST IN NEPAL AND SRI LANKA

LEACH:

The committee will come to order.

On behalf of the subcommittee, I would like to extend a warm welcome to our distinguished administration witness, Dan Camp, who is the principal deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia affairs in the newly expanded Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.

We welcome you back, and we look forward to a productive relationship with the newest assistant secretary from the bureau, Richard Boucher, who many of us know, and who is a well respected career professional in the department.

The subcommittee meets today to review recent developments in two important countries in South Asia, both of whom have been struggling to overcome bitter legacies of domestic unrest that threaten internal stability and economic prosperity in the societies.

Although the origins of the conflicts in Nepal and Sri Lanka are distinct, both present profound humanitarian and political challenges for the region, as well as for the United States and the broader international community.

Each year since the Maoist rebellion began in 1996, the Himalayan kingdom of Nepal has experienced ever increasing difficulty coping with the challenge posed by the rebels and in managing the overall political, economic and security situation. The assumption of direct rule by the king, with its associated restrictions on civil liberties has not stabilized the situation; indeed, it appears to have only strengthened the Maoists as an alternative to the state and bolstered ties between them and the legitimate political parties.

Meanwhile, already among the poorest and least developed countries in the world, Nepal's economy has continued to weaken. Compounding the ongoing tragedy for the people of Nepal has been a marked deterioration in the human rights conditions, with the Department of State concluding in its country report for 2005 that the government's poor record worsened, and that the Maoists also continue to perpetrate numerous abuses.

In Sri Lanka, despite relatively good economic fundamentals and a solid social welfare structure, the country has not taken off as another regional tiger, principally because it remains mired in a multi-decade long civil war. Prospects for a permanent resolution of the conflict appear dim at this moment. Fortunately, eleventh hour efforts by the Norwegian government to broker a new round of negotiations in Geneva late last month helped save the badly battered four-year-old cease-fire agreement from likely collapse.

From a congressional perspective, one has the sense that the assassination of the foreign minister in the summer of 2005, coupled with other politically motivated killings, dramatically eroded support for the current cease-fire agreement among many of the majority Sinhalese people in Sri Lanka. Likewise, one also has the impression that the failure of the government to reach an agreement with the Tamil separatists on a mechanism to provide post-tsunami relief to areas in the north and east of the country, as well as ongoing paramilitary operations against the insurgents, may have convinced the insurgent leadership that Colombo was unlikely to commit to a just and permanent peace.

In this troubling context, we underscore our concern for the people of both countries. We have a number of questions about the situation in Nepal and Sri Lanka and the implications of such for United States policy. We look forward to your testimony and the exchange of views to follow.

Mr. Faleomavaega?

FALEOMAVAEGA:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly commend you for holding this hearing this afternoon and would like to offer my personal welcome to our deputy assistant secretary, Donald Camp, here to testify before us this afternoon.

I think our discussions or hearing this afternoon concerning these countries, Nepal and Sri Lanka, certainly is well overdue.

Mr. Chairman, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal has killed well over 12,000 people since 1996. And the separatist unrest in Sri Lanka has cost some 63,000 lives since 1983. Although these struggles each have different roots, both are of deep concern, not only to the administration, but certainly to us as members of the Congress.

In Nepal, the Maoist insurgency continues to undermine political stability and prospects for economic development. In February of last year, the king dismissed the government, arrested dissidents and political opponents, imposed a broad array of restrictions on civil liberties, setting back Nepal's democracy and eroding even further the unity of legitimate political forces in opposition to the Maoists.

In Sri Lanka, the United States is working with other concerned parties to help maintain a tenuous cease-fire, and in more than 10 years of -- some 10 years of conflict between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil, or the LTTE.

The U.S. has designated the LTTE as a foreign terrorist organization. I don't know if that's an accurate characterization, but this will be certainly one of the questions I will raise to Mr. Camp. The Communist Party in Nepal is also listed as other terrorist group.

In February some four years ago, a permanent cease-fire was reached, and generally has been observed by both sides. And in September of 2002, the government in Colombo and the LTTE held the first peace talks in seven years, with LTTE indicating that it was willing to accept autonomy rather than independence. The two sides agreed in principle to seek a solution through a federal structure.

However, the situation in Sri Lanka and Nepal remains serious and unresolved. Given both of these issues, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing Secretary Camp's testimony this afternoon. Thank you.

LEACH:

Well, Mr. Camp, let me welcome you. We note that today is the Ides of March.

(LAUGHTER)

I think that the new blockade of Nepal's capital and the province in Colombo -- it's an unpropitious day to testify, but please, you're welcome to set forth as you see fit. Without objection, a fuller statement, if you have one, will be placed in the record. But please proceed.

CAMP:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Faleomavaega. I appreciate being invited here today to discuss recent developments in Nepal and Sri Lanka.

I'd like to read a short version of my statement for the record. First on Nepal.

U.S. objectives in Nepal are the restoration of multiparty democracy and the prevention of a Maoist takeover. Reconciliation between the king and the political parties and a return to democracy is the only path toward an effective counterinsurgency strategy, as well as restoration of security and human rights.

President Bush made this very clear in New Delhi just two weeks ago, when he publicly called on the king of Nepal to reach out to the parties, and he called on the Maoists to abandon violence.

A Maoist takeover would almost certainly lead to instability in a region of great importance to the United States. Nepal nestles between China and India, the two fastest-growing economies in the world.

Our ability to advance our relationships with these two emerging powers will go far to determining the success of U.S. foreign policy in the coming decades.

It's clear that the political crisis in Nepal is reaching an acute phase. Since assuming what he called "temporary" authoritarian power on February 1, 2005, King Gyanendra and his government have become increasingly divorced from the political parties and population, while the Maoist insurgency makes advances in the countryside and continues its campaign of violence and intimidation.

The February 8th municipal elections called by King Gyanendra only showcased his increasing isolation. While the political parties boycotted that election and organized mass demonstrations, the Maoists stepped up attacks to disrupt voting. Only 20 percent of eligible voters participated in those elections.

The Maoists, meanwhile, continue their drive to topple the monarchy. Since ending their four-month, unilateral cease-fire in January, they've launched a new wave of attacks and have made clear in public statements that they intend to increase pressure through April.

Since the king's seizure of power in February 2005, we have placed a hold on lethal assistance to Nepal, as have India and the European Union. We have worked very closely with India, the U.K., the E.U. and others to keep pressure on the king. Now Japan and China have also become more engaged on Nepal policy and have called to the king to reconcile with parties.

Regrettably, one year after the king's action, democracy has not been restored, nor have human rights conditions significantly improved. We continue to pursue very actively our efforts to address these twin problems: the loss of democracy and the threat of the Maoist insurgents.

Let me turn now to Sri Lanka and its longstanding conflict and very fragile peace process.

The senseless assassination of Foreign Minister Kadirgamar last August and a very intense presidential campaign heightened tensions in Sri Lanka during the fall of 2005. Following President Mahinda Rajapaksa's election on November 17th, escalating violence took the lives of Tamil civilians and almost 100 Sri Lankan security personnel, and put the four-year cease-fire agreement between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE very much at risk.

As the attacks continued, President Rajapaksa came under pressure to respond. But to his credit, the government showed significant restraint in the face of these provocations and maintained the cease- fire.

Given that deteriorating situation on the ground, the United States, the E.U., Japan and Norway -- the so-called Co-Chairs of the Sri Lanka Donors Group -- met several times late last year and early this year to discuss possible solutions. The Co-Chairs sent strong messages to both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE to end the violence and uphold the fragile cease-fire agreement. In this respect, Norway's vital role as facilitator of the peace process merits special attention.

Sri Lankan government and LTTE negotiators met in Geneva on February 22 and 23, the first time in over three years that the two sides had returned to the negotiating table. The negotiators achieved some significant outcomes that should give the peace process in Sri Lanka some new momentum.

First, they agreed to refrain from violence and to uphold the cease-fire agreement. The government specifically addressed the problem of armed groups, a very serious LTTE grievance, and committed to ensuring that no armed group or person other than government security forces will carry arms or conduct armed operations. The LTTE pledged to ensure there would be no acts of violence against the security forces.

Given the difficulty involved in even convening this meeting, we consider it a significant achievement that both sides agreed to meet again in Geneva, April 19 to 21.

Despite the long conflict, Sri Lanka is a fully-functioning, stable democracy with strong democratic institutions and traditions, including freedom of the press. Human rights violations in Sri Lanka are largely related to the ongoing domestic conflict.

Government security forces, LTTE cadres and other armed groups have all been accused of abuses. Sri Lankan police and security forces have been accused of torture and links to groups participating in armed attacks.

The LTTE has engaged in a whole host of abuses -- politically motivating killings, disappearances, torture and much more. We are particularly concerned about ongoing LTTE recruitment of child soldiers, in spite of its pledge to end such activity.

Mr. Chairman, we're deeply committed to achieving peace and stability in Nepal and Sri Lanka. The president's remarks on Nepal following his meeting with Indian Prime Minister Singh highlight the level of importance to us of these issues.

We will continue to work in South Asia with our friends and allies, through international fora, such as the Co-Chairs Group in Sri Lanka, and through the outreach of our embassies in Kathmandu and Colombo, to help the Nepalese and Sri Lankan people overcome the considerable obstacles before them on their paths back to peace and prosperity.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and I would be pleased to answer any questions.

LEACH:

Let me first ask a bit about Nepal, because while there are similarities of trauma, there are no similarities of exact circumstance, and there are no ties that are of any significance between the two countries of Sri Lanka and Nepal.

It's my understanding that U.S. diplomacy works primarily with India and the U.K. in this area. Is there any thought of trying to establish some sort of formal structure that reaches out to all sorts of sides involving a larger framework, whether it be the United Nations or a specific framework?

I mean, let's say -- once can visualize another six party talks. You could involve China as well as India, Britain. Japan's interested. Russia is nearby -- never has played much of a role.

We sometimes shy away from trying to involve people for one reason or another. We even -- you might even think about the U.S.

But it's my understanding, India, of course, abhors the idea of Chinese involvement. The Chinese, I'm told, are deeply embarrassed that the rebel movement calls itself Maoist. But that might give them some leverage with that side.

But what thinking are we doing in widening discussions? Is there total disadvantage of this? Is there some advantage? Is it an intolerable thought? Is it possible? Are there new ways that we should be thinking of this?

Given that, I mean -- there are news reports, literally as of today, things have escalated.

Do you have any sense for this?

CAMP:

Sure. I think that's a very reasonable approach to take, sir. In fact, let me just say that we have worked very closely with India, very closely with the U.K. -- not exclusively with those two.

We have a regular dialogue with the E.U. on Nepal. We've talked to other countries, including China, about the situation in Nepal.

We have also thought about a larger group, as the kind you described. A few years ago, the U.K. actually hosted a group something similar to that, a kind of friends of Nepal meeting, to discuss where we should be going together.

And as I recall, it was quite widely attended. India attended. I believe the People's Republic of China attended, as well. It was a useful, one-time meeting. But there's no reason why something like that couldn't be revived.

I would say it's probably, primarily up to the Nepalese to decide how we structure such a thing. But I would certainly not rule out some kind of multilateral effort to show our common goals in Nepal.

And I think an important factor in the current situation is, that there is very much unanimity in the international community as to where Nepal should be going, which is basically back toward democracy, back toward internal stability, and certainly, complete opposition to the goals of the Maoists.

LEACH:

Are there particular parties that have particular leverage with the Maoists?

CAMP:

You know, since they don't have ties to any country, it's very hard to find leverage over their activities. They do not, as far as I know, actively fund raise in the West, although there may be some of that. So, there are very few ways that we can seek to crack down on them outside the country.

LEACH:

Are there particular leverages against the king vis-a-vis the democratic parties of Nepal? That is, it strikes us that -- everything I've ever heard from the Department of State is that we would like a return to democracy. And yet, we've seen very little movement in that direction.

So, how do you put pressure on the king in a credible way?

CAMP:

Sure. I would have to say that we have tried to demonstrate very vocally our disapproval of the course he's embarked upon. And by getting much of the rest of the international community to respond similarly, I think it's been made very clear to the king that he is internationally isolated. There is virtually no support for the course he has embarked on.

Our ambassador regularly meets with the king. We have sought other envoys to go to Nepal and meet with the king and to explain to him our concern that the path he has embarked upon is not helpful for the future of Nepal. We have been as clear as we possibly can.

And I would say the fact that President Bush spoke out in New Delhi on this subject is certainly the most, the clearest expression you could have of the high level of our concern. He called very clearly for the king to reach out to the political parties in order to restore democracy. That's basically what we've been trying to do.

LEACH:

Well, as one who was in the region shortly after the tsunami, one heard a lot of comment about the traumas of the tsunami in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, and massive questioning, and some with a great deal of hopefulness, that the idea of dealing with a nature-made disaster might precipitate dealing with manmade traumas.

Indonesia -- it appears that that very much is the case, and we're all extraordinarily impressed with the manner of the government and the opposition that moved to what appears to be a modus vivendi and maybe even reconciliation.

It appears in Nepal that isn't the case, and that if anything, things have gotten more tense in the last year or year-and-a-half. Some of it may relate to the manner in which assistance in the wake of the tsunami occurred. Some may be simply in the wake of intransigence of the Tamils to accept any jurisdiction of the central government. Some may simply be a bizarre circumstance that humanity wasn't looked at first as humanity, but more in terms of the conflict that was ongoing.

I would assume that your office in your department of the Department of State, that there is a lot of discourse that's gone on in the differences between Sri Lanka and Indonesia, and why one worked and one didn't.

Do you have any preliminary conclusions? And are there lessons that still can be gained, say, from Indonesia that might be applied to Sri Lanka?

CAMP:

I would say that we had high hopes, in fact, immediately after the tsunami, that the same dynamic would be in effect in Sri Lanka. And, in fact, there was a brief period when I think the whole nation came together, still reeling from the tsunami disaster.

Unfortunately, that was not sustained. And I don't have a very good explanation of why that didn't happen.

Obviously, there was a real attempt, I would say, by the government of Sri Lanka in Colombo to find a way to make sure that the north realized that assistance would be provided equitably, because that was the first question that arose: are we going to get our share? We were so heavily hit, the LTTE said, we need our share of reconstruction assistance.

There was a confused effort to put together a mechanism that would guarantee such equitable distribution. It was a long and tough negotiation. And when the two sides finally agreed, a Sri Lankan constitutional court ruled the arrangement unlawful, basically, so it never went into effect.

That's not to say that assistance wasn't delivered to the LTTE- controlled areas in the north. It was. NGOs are very active up there. There was aid delivered to the affected...

LEACH:

The U.N. is very active...

CAMP:

I'm sorry?

LEACH:

The U.N. is more active up there...

CAMP:

The U.N. is active. The World Food Program.

We do not -- we have legal constraints on providing assistance to the LTTE, obviously, because of the foreign terrorist organization status. But even -- we provide assistance to NGOs, and they are, as I say, quite active.

LEACH:

I appreciate that. I will tell you, I am a strong supporter of the Department of State. But as a member of Congress, I was not pleased that after requests to visit the north, the embassy refused to arrange for it.

And I will tell you, I was very offended at that. I thought it was a sign from the United States government that was very imperfect.

But I am -- if I were to have bet which country would have the greater hopes of reconciling at the time, I would have bet on Sri Lanka over Indonesia. And yet, it appears Indonesians have moved rather remarkably.

And I think we all are still very hopeful of the role that Norway is playing. And I think as a Congress, we all should make a point of tipping our hat to Norwegian goodwill and good efforts in this regard.

CAMP:

I agree, sir. And they've taken a lot of abuse, frankly, for their efforts, and we think that they can only be commended for their perseverance and their willingness to commit their own resources to this peace effort.

LEACH:

Mr. Faleomavaega?

FALEOMAVAEGA:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't know whether to suggest how we might begin in terms of our dialogue on these two countries. Conventional understanding of any given situation in terms of our own interests, as in any country or in any region, is a measurement of our economic and our military strategic interests. Obviously, neither of these two areas are very prominent in terms of our participation.

Have we been asked by the leaders of these two countries for assistance in terms of how to break the stalemate or the impasse, in terms of

what has happened to these two countries?

Let's take Nepal in the beginning.

I'm given to understand that it was the younger brother of the king who was assassinated, that succeeded to the throne. And is it true that he's even more hated than the king who was assassinated? There's some understanding also that he may have been part of the plot that caused the king to...

CAMP:

I would say there are a lot of conspiracy theories that float around Nepal. I don't think there's any credible evidence to suggest that he was involved.

The monarchy itself is rather -- is traditionally respected in Nepal. The monarch is considered the reincarnation of the god Vishnu. So, I mean, that is a position -- that's a widely held belief in Nepal.

So, I think that probably there is still respect for the monarchy itself.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

And if he is to be assassinated tomorrow, are there a pretty good number of successors to the throne if something happens to him?

CAMP:

There is a -- the next -- the successor would be the crown prince, Prince Paras.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

Crown prince of the...

CAMP:

The son of the current king would be the successor.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

Of the king. Oh, I see. And he has brothers also, and sisters?

CAMP:

I cannot tell you for sure where the line of succession goes after that.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

In other words, we're not lacking in successors, like the Saud family in Saudi Arabia, right?

CAMP:

There are not hundreds of cousins, no. That's correct.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

You mentioned something earlier about China being somewhat embarrassed, or somewhat concerned about being categorized, or this one main opposition group as Maoists.

Can you share with us what is -- is it because they take their doctrine from Mao Zedong? Or has it been any different from the Marxist socialist ideological theories about this thing? Could you elaborate on this? Why are they being labeled as Maoists?

CAMP:

Well, they have labeled themselves Maoists. They have chosen from the books of Mao, from Marx, from Lenin. They have, I think, also borrowed from the ideas of Pol Pot and the Shining Path. They are a very eclectic sort of group. And I have to say, they've chosen the worst aspects of all of these groups.

The Chinese objection, of course, is that this suggests that somehow they are inheritors of the tradition of Zedong. And the Chinese by no means accept that.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

And associated with the PRC.

CAMP:

And, well, by extension, yes. And there is no such connection.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

No connection whatsoever.

What percentage of the Nepalese population support the Maoist movement?

CAMP:

It's really hard to say. I would say that they mainly have supported themselves in the countryside through intimidation. We estimate that the number of actual fighters, members of the Maoist organization are perhaps 6,000 or 7,000, so, a relatively small number.

I would say that in the countryside, again, it's mostly, it's not so much active support for the Maoists as fear of the Maoists. That's not to say that there weren't grievances there. I mean, there have years of poor governance in Nepal. Government services were never delivered very effectively to the rural areas. There's extreme poverty.

So, there's unhappiness with the government. But that doesn't necessarily militate into active support for what the Maoists have done in recent years.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

For example, for Nepal alone, you're looking at a population of about how many people living there?

CAMP:

Twenty-five million.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

Twenty-five million people live there.

In trying to establish a constitutional monarchy, is there any chance that this might occur, in terms of the king's willingness to have a similar parliamentary -- similar to the British system?

CAMP:

Well, since 1990, the king took more of a constitutional role. And there was the beginnings of a multiparty democracy over the last 15 years.

It has never settled in fully, I would say. The parties were not all that strong nationwide. And the king's decision a year ago, or 14 months ago, to take power from the parties was a blow to that.

We've taken the position that the king must go back at least to before -- at a minimum -- to the situation before February 1st, but that was hardly perfect.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

We're not questioning the king's motive in this instance. I mean, he sincerely is trying to bring order first to the government, and then later on hold some kind of elections to provide for that kind of democracy.

Isn't this -- I mean, are we also questioning the king's motives in this effort?

CAMP:

I would say, his stated goal has been to defeat the Maoists and hold elections to bring back a democratically elected government.

The problem is that he has not used or engaged the political parties. And if you don't engage the political parties, you can't have free and fair elections. And the municipal elections are a case in point.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

We didn't have a king in Indonesia, but they started off with idealistic goals of overcoming Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. And that's how Sukarno started, and then with Suharto also.

And this, by a combination of these two -- I would call them military dictatorships -- there was a cleansing of some half-a-million to a million Indonesians that were tortured and murdered, with a guise of saying that we're trying to stamp out Communism.

And I wonder if this is the same concern or fear that we might find ourselves in Nepal, where the king says, I want to get rid of the Maoists, when, in fact, he really wants to put his stamp of absolute rulership over the people, rather than offering democracy, as it was the intent -- as also happened in Indonesia.

CAMP:

I think the -- I shouldn't be speaking for the king, but I think he's unhappy with the political system that developed in his country.

And from our point of view, the only way to pursue democracy, to pursue prosperity, to pursue stability in the Nepali context, is the restore a multiparty democracy. That's the only way the Maoist insurgency will basically be defeated.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

Has the administration made a similar effort to what we've done in North Korea in calling a multilateral effort, like we've done against North Korea? Have we done a similar -- why haven't we enunciated a similar policy, multilateralism, which is something that I certainly support.

But you mentioned something about Norway. I guess they're the ones taking the lead in trying to provide some kind of arbitration, if you will, in doing this.

We don't seem to be taking the lead in doing this kind of effort. Are we...

CAMP:

Well, in Sri Lanka the Norwegians have taken the lead, voluntarily and with our enthusiastic support.

In Nepal, I would say that we have certainly made efforts to engage multilaterally -- India, E.U., the U.K. We've talked to China. We've talked to Japan. There is a common goal. There is no formal structure as there has been in Sri Lanka.

And that's something that we could certainly look at. We're always reviewing our policy toward Nepal. We have not, so far, found that to be the most productive means.

I would say that India is probably the biggest player here, just because they are the big country next door.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

Well, that...

CAMP:

They have an important responsibility.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

That was going to be my next question concerning Sri Lanka.

Quite obviously, India is probably the most dominate country as far as Sri Lanka is concerned. Have they taken any initiative, similar to Norway, to intervene constructively in trying to make an effort to be an arbitrator, or be a help to this Tamil Tiger thing that has been going on now for how many years? I mean...

CAMP:

For, well...

FALEOMAVAEGA:

... for the 16,000 people...

CAMP:

... the insurgency broke out in 1983.

India actually made an effort to get actively involved in the late '80s with something called the Indian peacekeeping force. That did not work out well for India. They have since shied away from active involvement. And that has been something that we have discussed with them on a number of occasions.

But the LTTE, in fact, was responsible for the killing of Rajiv Gandhi, the prime minister at the time. So, they have been severely affected by the crisis there. They have preferred to play a very behind-the-scenes role.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

Well, Mr. Camp, I think probably -- and I don't want to sound somewhat fatalistic, the idea that five years from now we'll be holding another hearing on these same two countries, and we're going to be asking the same questions.

And I feel somewhat -- with all the resources and all the availability of what we can do as a country to be helpful to these two nations, my question is, are we really putting our best efforts to be helpful -- to arbitrate, to give them our best legal minds, or whatever it is that they need -- so we can be proactive in that respect?

I don't want to be giving the impression that, well, because they don't have any nukes over there, it's not an interest to our country. I'd kind of like to think that Nepal and Sri Lanka are just as important to us, as far as diplomacy is concerned, as any other country.

But my question is, are we really making a sincere effort to be helpful to those two countries? That's what I'm trying to dig into.

CAMP:

It will not surprise you that I will say yes, we are making great efforts. But let me also add that, I think you will see -- Congress will see -- an increasing emphasis by this administration on South Asia in general. I mean, we've just seen the president's trip to the region. I really do thing that...

FALEOMAVAEGA:

Wouldn't it have been better if he had went to Nepal himself? Or Sri Lanka?

CAMP:

I think Afghanistan, Pakistan and India was plenty.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

I'm asking (inaudible) an impossibility.

CAMP:

But there will really be an emphasis on South Asia. And I think it will have an impact on our efforts in Nepal and Sri Lanka.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LEACH:

Well, I would tell the gentleman, the king might be descended from a god, but from this committee's perspective, we think that the ranking member is descended from the Sage of Samoa.

(LAUGHTER)

FALEOMAVAEGA:

You should make a visit there, Mr. Chairman, maybe, one of these days.

LEACH:

Let me come back a little bit on the role of the United States. We're obviously a large country with some interest in the region and some historical ties.

Other countries also have large ties, actually. Japan has a particular relationship to Sri Lanka, perhaps less to Nepal, but wants to play a role there.

I've often thought, internally and sometimes externally, process is our most important product -- kind of a take on GE. And it strikes me that the best that can be said for United States engagement in both Nepal and Sri Lanka is that we play kind of a consultative role.

And so, one of the great questions is, do you set up process types of circumstances that have some hope of involving all the parties?

Now, to a degree, in Sri Lanka, we have the Norwegians, and that is a very strong plus.

In Nepal, one doesn't sense any kind of formal process. We only have consultations to talk about. And there are many types and varieties of processes that one can establish.

But I hope American diplomacy is not such that thinks that we are the process. And the consultative manner that we're going about things makes me think that that is the case.

And I am one that is very open to involving lots of parties, some of whom we may feel have rival interests in the world. But the great interest we have is what's good for the people. And what's good for the people is, obviously, a sane government, because without such there is virtually no hope of economic advancement, particularly in Nepal.

And so, if I were to advise you at all -- and it's kind of presumptuous to consider advising -- it is, think in terms of one precise thought. And that is, what process can be established that might reach to some sort of new steps on all sides? And once you have a process thought through, then you apply strategies through it.

I believe that there has been a lack of commitment to new thoughts and process. And I would just throw that out as strongly as I can. That process might involve the U.N.; it might not. It might involve five, six, seven country groupings; it might involve three, four, five.

It might involve special interlocutors. And it obviously has to be something that is of a nature that parties to the conflict are willing to give some credence to. And so, it's conceivable you make no sense of establishing process until you get a sense from parties what they're willing to think through.

But I would put an absolute imperative on the "P" word, from which other things can then uphold. And I stress this because, I mean, very thoughtfully you noted that virtually the entire international community has a consensus of what they would like to see happen in Nepal. That puts it in a much more manageable international context than many other problems in the world, and in a manageable way.

There does not appear to be stark religious differentiations. There appears to be a traditional power struggle and traditional angst that's arisen from imperfect governance.

But I think that is where I would put all my stakes at this time. Now, does that seem unreasonable?

CAMP:

It seems eminently reasonable, sir. And let me just -- well, it's certainly not presumptuous to offer advice; we welcome it. And I want to assure you, we are looking actively for ways that we can influence the situation, looking for new ways to approach the problem in Nepal.

We realize that one year after the king's February 1st action, that not much has moved. We want to make a difference here, and we will look at any way we can to make that difference.

So, thank you, and I promise you we'll take a serious look at the process.

LEACH:

Fair enough.

In Sri Lanka, we have just a completely different thing. And we all know there are outside additions to the dilemma as well as inside. Some of them are quite understandable; some, I assume the State Department's uncomfortable about.

Would you like to go into any of that?

CAMP:

I'm sorry. Could you be a little more specific about...

LEACH:

The issue that there appears to be outside support for activities that are understandable. On the other hand, do they help stabilize or destabilize the situation?

CAMP:

There's outside support for the LTTE in terms of outside fundraising, active involvement in the Tamil diaspora around the world. In that context, I'd like to draw attention to a Human Rights Watch report that just came out this week, I think, that talked about the kinds of activities that the LTTE carries out in places like Canada to extort money for their activities.

I'm very glad that attention is brought to this. They're forbidden by law from fundraising in this country, and we are enforcing that. But that kind of thing needs to stop.

As far as the government is concerned, we make no bones about it; we support the government vis-a-vis the LTTE. And we're providing a limited amount of military assistance.

The government itself has been accused of supporting armed groups outside the security forces. I can't confirm that, and I would not want to verify it. But they committed in the last round of talks to make sure that no armed groups could attack the LTTE outside the cease-fire agreements, or in conformity with the cease-fire agreement.

I don't know if that answered your question.

LEACH:

Well, it did.

I want to just raise one of the things happening in world affairs, which is kind of a vision issue.

Recently, six months ago, I was in Mongolia. And I was very impressed with the foreign assistance at the private level coming back, that is, remittances, that seem to be making a very impressive impact on economic development.

And the notion of a reconciliation with the terrific pride that appears to exist of Tamil residents around the world with their people, could make such a difference. I raise this because, as one reads of support that goes back for arms, wouldn't it be phenomenal to have support go back for economic development and the real upgrading of Tamil society from an economic perspective?

And here, I know there are provisions of law that apply, and some based upon how governments interpret things. But one of the things that I'd like to think through and ask your advice on is that, when we can't be directly involved, there are principled reasons that that sometimes is the case, but there are disadvantages.

My sense is, I mean, from a bare few days in Nepal, I was extremely -- excuse me, in Sri Lanka -- I was extremely impressed with the United Nations role in Sri Lanka, and disproportionately relative to everybody else, it is playing a role in the Tamil-occupied areas.

I think it's reason, frankly, for U.S. support of the U.N. But it underscores that it's good to have representation from the West that's of a nature that's interested in helping people, unrelated to political movements.

And I'd frankly hope that this would be an understood aspect of American assistance on the tsunami. And in that regard, I can't tell you that I am impressed that assistance from the United States would become exclusively tied up in a one-dimensional approach based upon Sri Lankan law, that as I would have hoped we would have more ways of helping in the Tamil area than simply, exclusively the Sinhalese area.

Would you care to comment on that?

CAMP:

Well, I'd be glad to.

Certainly, we are contributors, for instance, to the Asian Development Bank -- generous contributors. Asian Development Bank has financed the main highway from Colombo up to Jaffna, which goes right through the LTTE-controlled area. So in that sense, the ADB has played a part in developing infrastructure that helps bring the country together.

After the tsunami, we have committed $135 million for reconstruction and rehabilitation. A lot of that is going to, for instance, a major infrastructure project on the east coast, which is an area that is shared by Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim almost equally.

We are certainly not tying our assistance only to one part of the country. We're doing everything we can to make sure that that money is expended as widely as possible.

We are constrained by not Sri Lankan law, but actually by U.S. law, which prohibits material assistance to the LTTE. To the extent that we can, we're making sure that that aid is spread as broadly as possible.

LEACH:

Yes. Well, I appreciate that. All I'm stressing is the awkwardness of, you have people-to-people and human relations, as well as political relations. And there is no way whatsoever that the United States Congress can condone assassinations of political leaders. And that becomes a very difficult circumstance.

But by the same time, it's impossible to condone ignoring children in difficulty, through no fault of their own. I'm not as convinced that we have, as a government, figured out exactly how we relate on a people-to-people level in these circumstances, recognizing that our government has true constraints under our own law.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

We have an additional member here. While Brad settles down, I just have a couple more questions I would like to ask Secretary Camp.

I'm aware that Japan and the United States are the primary donors to the Asian Development Bank. Could you cite for the record what percentage of the total assets the U.S. funds for the Asian Development Bank?

CAMP:

No, sir. I'm afraid I don't have that number at my fingertips. I'll have to get back to you on that.

The percentage of U.S. -- what percentage of ADB resources the United States contributes?

FALEOMAVAEGA:

Right.

CAMP:

I would not want to hazard a guess without...

FALEOMAVAEGA:

Could you put that for the record?

CAMP:

I would be happy to.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

And I'd like to ask the same for the International Monetary Fund. Also for the World Bank. Those seem to be the regional institutions that I know we do play a very significant role in providing assets and funding, for which the world doesn't know.

CAMP:

Right.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

And is not aware of.

Are there other regional organizations that the U.S. is a sponsoring state in this region?

CAMP:

There's one, actually, the Colombo Plan. It's on a much smaller scale, and we contribute a relatively small amount. But it is headquartered in Colombo. It does work in things like anti-narcotics, and so forth.

I would also add that -- what I should cite particularly is private NGOs, things like Save the Children and Catholic Relief Services, where U.S. private individuals contribute enormous amounts. And they are among the major donors in Sri Lanka, particularly, post- tsunami. And they have been very good about providing assistance everywhere and providing assistance equitably.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

Chairman Leach had mentioned earlier about this magic word that I was trying to dig out of you, and that is process.

I know that one of the initiatives that the administration had taken, where the president has appointed Karen Hughes as the undersecretary for public diplomacy, I sure wish we would have done that five years ago rather than doing it now, in terms of re-tracking our situation, in terms of defining exactly what our foreign policy is towards -- not only towards other countries, but towards other regions of the world.

It's not a simple task, as I'm certain, in terms of trying to define what that process is, whether it be applicable to Nepal or to Sri Lanka. But it certainly gives rise to exactly what role does the United States have to play in this part of the world?

Quite obviously, the president's personal visit to India underscores a very significant change in our own foreign policy towards this region of the world, when you talk about nuclear energy, when you talk about the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I mean, there's no question that it does have global implications.

But when we bring it down to the specifics of these countries, Nepal and Sri Lanka, what does it do for the United States in terms of what benefit do we gain from this, by trying to resolve an ongoing problem that has been going on for years?

Is there any given indication in terms of how the king in Nepal is trying to -- is it really the Maoists that seems to give him the worst problem in trying to resolve the crisis there, or any other factors?

CAMP:

Let me first say that I think that one thing that our years of involvement in Nepal and Sri Lanka have gained us is a real appreciation in both countries for the humanitarian and the positive motives of the United States in both countries. No one thinks that we have ulterior motives in either country.

In Nepal we've had Peace Corps for -- or we had Peace Corps -- for 40 years. Unfortunately, it had to be withdrawn a couple of years ago for security reasons. But the Peace Corps has an enviable reputation in Nepal.

We have spent many millions in Nepal over the years fighting infectious diseases and building better health clinics, and so forth. We have a very high reputation in Nepal.

Same thing is true in Sri Lanka, especially post-tsunami. I think there's a real appreciation for what the United States government and people have contributed.

The whole question of what is -- the question you asked, I think is, what is the king attempting to do? And who is he confronted with?

And I would say that the Maoists -- from our point of view -- the Maoists are the real crisis that are affecting Nepal right now. That has to be dealt with.

But the path to confronting and defeating the Maoists is not merely military, but has to involve engaging the political parties, engaging the political class and developing a united front of what I would call the legitimate political actors in Nepal. They're the ones who have to confront the Maoists.

FALEOMAVAEGA:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Camp.

LEACH:

Mr. Sherman?

SHERMAN:

Thanks for holding these hearings.

I'm going to focus on Sri Lanka. I've urged the State Department to design a road map for the Tamil Tigers, so that they would know what steps they would need to take to get off the terrorist list.

The response has been, well, we don't do that, which basically means that we're not acting to encourage the Tamil Tigers to improve their behavior.

Perhaps deputy -- principal deputy assistant secretary -- you could outline here what actions do we want the Tamil Tigers to take or refrain from.

CAMP:

Actually, I think it's fairly straightforward.

The LTTE was put on the terrorist list, because of their violent activities.

What they would need to do would be to basically renounce terrorism, renounce violence in...

SHERMAN:

What is the difference between terrorism on the one hand, and waging a legitimate guerrilla struggle on the other? What is the difference between Al Qaida and George Washington?

CAMP:

If I could...

SHERMAN:

(inaudible) George Washington did use violence.

CAMP:

Last I checked, though, he did not blow up buildings with civilians. I mean, the LTTE has been famous for its attacks, its suicide bomb attacks on civilian targets.

SHERMAN:

Well, obviously...

CAMP:

And that makes a real difference.

SHERMAN:

Obviously, when you focus on civilian targets, that's terrorism, when that's the deliberate objective of your behavior.

CAMP:

And I also have to add that, as far as the United States government is concerned, I mean, the Sri Lankan government is a sovereign government that we recognize. We support that government and its territorial integrity.

So, the LTTE, to call them a legitimate organization...

SHERMAN:

Wait a minute. Are you saying that if there was a country in Europe during our revolution that didn't recognize the independence of the United States, they would have had to view George Washington as a terrorist, simply because they didn't agree with his objectives?

CAMP:

I'm simply saying that we support the Sri Lankan government as a legitimate government of the country of Sri Lanka. We see the LTTE as a terrorist organization.

SHERMAN:

And if they were to stop targeting civilians, what would be our policy?

CAMP:

If they were to clearly renounce terrorism and stop carrying out those attacks, then I think, once we were convinced that they are sincere, then we can look at their terrorist listing. But they have not given us any reason to be generous about their motives, let's put it that way, sir.

SHERMAN:

Well, their motives, in the sense of what their political objectives are, were sufficient to enter into a peace process. Terrorism is not a matter of motives; it's a matter of tactics.

There are those who long for a universal caliphate, but they don't kill civilians to achieve it. We don't call them terrorists just because their stated objective is similar to that of Mr. bin Laden. Terrorism is a tactic; it's not an objective.

I have simply been -- well, I was frankly disturbed by that reaction. The LTTE has made a number of statements to renounce terrorism. And we have taken the IRA off the terrorist list. We took Fatah off the terrorist list, or the Palestinian Authority of the PLO -- whichever incarnation they had prior to losing control of the Palestinian Authority.

And I would hope that we would start telling these groups what we want from them, with the expectation that if they deliver, they will get off the terrorist list. And I do think, though, it's legitimate to take a look at their objectives, as well as their tactics, as one consideration.

I would think that seeking some degree of autonomy for northeast Sri Lanka is not a terrible objective.

Perhaps you -- where do you think we're headed in Sri Lanka? Are we headed for another round of war?

CAMP:

I guess I'm a little more optimistic now that they've returned to peace talks. It's been four years -- well, three years since the talks broke off. The fact that the two sides are talking again has to be a reason for optimism.

They've got a ways to go, but I think the government in Sri Lanka is committed to looking for a peaceful way out of this. And I think everyone is tired of 23 years of war.

SHERMAN:

The government has taken substantial action to prevent aid from reaching the parts of the island that were most affected by the tsunami, namely the northeast, which generally supports the Tamil Tigers, the LTTE.

What has the United States done to make sure that aid that's supposed to go to individuals is not interrupted for political reasons?

CAMP:

I would -- I guess I would say that the government of Sri Lanka made efforts to in fact make sure that aid was not only equitably delivered, but it would seem to be equitably delivered. And their attempt to establish this mechanism, with which they reached agreement on the LTTE -- a fairly significant achievement that took quite awhile -- was thrown out in the courts. Therefore, they've had to find other mechanisms.

I think I would take issue with the idea that they have actively attempted to prevent tsunami assistance from reaching the northeast.

SHERMAN:

I think a government is responsible for all three branches of its government. For example, Saddam Hussein is on trial, because his revolutionary courts decided to execute 152 people, 148 people.

And I would hate to think that we take the position that it's OK to disrupt tsunami relief as long as it's done by the judicial branch of the Colombo government, and not the executive branch of the Colombo government.

Countries are responsible for their own constitutions and their own -- and all three branches of the government. So, I would hope that we would do more to say it is not an acceptable excuse to say, people on the ground aren't getting the aid that the world has generously provided, because, oh, it's a different branch of your government.

I yield back. And I'd point out to the chairman, who also serves with me on the Financial Services Committee, that I need to go there, and he may have to, as well.

LEACH:

OK. Fair enough. I appreciate the advice.

Let me turn to a brief topic you mentioned in your prepared text, but not in your summary, and that relates to the plight of the ethnic Nepalese from Bhutan.

Are you suggesting that we should be prepared to accept, or apply refugee status that would allow them to come to the United States?

CAMP:

I think first we have to do our very best to ensure that those who want to return to Bhutan are allowed to do so. This is a longstanding humanitarian problem that should be resolvable.

Bhutan and Nepal have been negotiating for years over return of those who are entitled to Bhutanese citizenship. Last year there was an agreement that would allow at least a small group to go back. That was a good start, but it hasn't been implemented.

I think once that -- once people that have gone back -- or, excuse me -- once people who are entitled to go back and want to go back have returned to Bhutan, then we should be looking at the international community stepping in to see what we can do in terms of durable solutions for the rest of the refugees.

LEACH:

What is the number we're looking at?

CAMP:

There are roughly 100,000 now, with natural increase over 15 years, who are in the refugee camps in eastern Nepal.

The initial number that was permitted to return under the first Bhutanese-Nepal agreement was only about 640. Even those have not yet gone back. We'd like to see that happen.

LEACH:

Do they have the rights of citizenship of Nepal? Do they vote in the elections?

CAMP:

They do not vote in the elections at the moment. They are, as far as they are concerned, Bhutanese citizens. And they have lived there for varying numbers of years before they left in the early '90s.

LEACH:

Do you have anything else?

FALEOMAVAEGA:

No, Mr. Chairman.

LEACH:

Let me thank you very much. We have problems of commitments to other committees, as well as the Congress. We thank you for your testimony. We appreciate it very much.

CAMP:

Thank you very much.

LEACH:

The committee is adjourned.

List of Speakers

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JAMES A. LEACH (R-IA) CHAIRMAN

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DAN BURTON, (R-IN) VICE CHAIRMAN

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ELTON GALLEGLY (R-CA)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DANA ROHRABACHER (R-CA)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE STEVE CHABOT (R-OH)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE RON PAUL (R-TX))

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOE WILSON (R-SC)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HENRY J. HYDE (R-IL) EX OFFICIO

U.S. DELEGATE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA (D-AS) RANKING MEMBER

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SHERROD BROWN (D-OH)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE EARL BLUMENAUER (D-OR)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DIANE E. WATSON (D-CA)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ADAM SMITH (D-WA)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE GARY L. ACKERMAN (D-NY)

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TOM LANTOS (D-CA) EX OFFICIO

WITNESSES:

DONALD CAMP, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT